I thank Julie Morgan for that intervention, and, indeed, that is one of the areas of concern that have been raised by authoritative experts on the constitution and legislation who have given evidence to the committee. So, it is one of our areas of concern, unfortunately.

These highlight some simple examples. It would take too long to explain how the complexity of the tests and the reservations work together and impact on the ability of the National Assembly to make laws. However, we have published an example of the difficulties that would be faced in relation to a hypothetical Bill, an example we shared with the House of Lords Constitution Committee last week. I would encourage anyone with an interest in the Bill to read that.

While the Bill actually needs a complete overhaul, it would be too complicated to attempt to rewrite a Bill of this nature through amendments. It’s a general point of principle highlighted in our predecessor committee’s ‘Making Laws in Wales’ report. So, faced with the challenges I have outlined, as a committee, and working constructively with stakeholders, we recognised that our role must be to suggest amendments that would make the Bill more workable than it currently is, reduce the bureaucracy that it introduces and, at the very least—at the very least—return the National Assembly’s legislative competence to that set out in the Government of Wales Act 2006. On this latter point, I would point out that the judgment on the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill should be viewed as the Supreme Court’s view of the UK’s Parliament’s intention in relation to that 2006 Act. This is an important constitutional point.

So, our approach was to identify and support amendments previously suggested by the Llywydd or the Welsh Government that delivered the objectives I have just referred to. In particular, we supported amendments that: in relation to clause 2, would make it much more explicit about the circumstances in which the UK Parliament would legislate on devolved matters; in relation to clause 3, would remove necessity tests to ensure that the Assembly’s current—current—level of competence was maintained; and, in relation to clause 18, sought to ensure that the executive functions of Welsh Ministers in devolved areas aligned with the legislative competence of the National Assembly.

We also suggested our own amendments, most notably an amendment to permit the National Assembly to consolidate, without modification, all the legislation relating to the Welsh constitution in our official languages. Such an approach is transparent and will make sure that the legislation is accessible. In a healthy democracy, this is vital so that citizens are clear about which parliamentary institution is responsible for law making in a particular policy area. But the complexity and lack of clarity within the Bill as currently drafted, calls into question the long-term durability of the settlement. Another factor impacting on this durability is the failure to provide for a distinct or a separate jurisdiction for Wales. As we heard at a stakeholder event, practical pressures—practical pressures—will inevitably arise for those practising law or giving advice on the law in Wales. So, the case for such a jurisdiction will continue to arise. It is regrettable, therefore, that this Bill is likely to perpetuate rather than resolve constitutional uncertainty.

A durable and a workable settlement is crucial to the constitutional integrity of the UK as well as to Wales. For that reason we do consider that politicians in the UK Parliament and the National Assembly will have to return to the Welsh devolution settlement sooner rather than later.