Thank you. As Members will be aware, the High Court handed down judgment in the matter of Miller, last week. And, as I said in my written statement on Friday, I consider that this case raises issues of profound importance, not only in relation to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, but also in relation to the wider constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom and the legal framework for devolution. It is for those reasons that I propose to apply to intervene in any appeal before the Supreme Court.

Llywydd, I think it is of paramount importance to emphasise at this point that, despite the political furore surrounding it and the frankly alarming tone of much of the press coverage, as the High Court itself said, this case involves a pure question of law. It is not concerned with the merits and the demerits of leaving the European Union, and the politics surrounding that.

Either through a lack of understanding of the UK constitution, or for other reasons, the judgment of the High Court has been misrepresented by some. In addition, there are those who have deliberately chosen to misrepresent the facts to challenge the independence of the judiciary—one of the cornerstones of our democratic parliamentary system. The reporting of the judgment in some newspapers was, frankly, a disgrace and an insult to the good name of journalism.

The democratic structure of the UK and, indeed, this Assembly, is built on a foundation of the rule of law and independence of our judicial system. The tragic recent history of Europe is littered with examples of countries that overthrew the rule of law and undermined the independence of the courts. That road is not a democratic one and it leads only in one direction, and I would hope those who may have made comments and statements in haste will want to reflect.

The sole legal question at issue is whether the United Kingdom Government can, as a matter of constitutional law, use the prerogative powers to give notice of withdrawal from the European Union. In seeking to intervene in any appeal, the Welsh Government will seek to reinforce the importance of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law—core, established principles of British constitutional law. On parliamentary sovereignty, the judgment quotes from the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill that,

‘The bedrock of the British constitution is…the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament.’

On the rule of law, the court confirms that the subordination of the Crown, that is, the Executive Government, to law is the foundation of the rule of law in the United Kingdom. So, put simply, this case, in finding that the prerogative cannot be used in the absence of a clear authority to change the law enacted by Parliament, is about the essence of our representative democracy. As the court said,

‘The United Kingdom is a constitutional democracy framed by legal rules and subject to the rule of law. The courts have a constitutional duty fundamental to the rule of law in a democratic state to enforce rules of constitutional law in the same way as the courts enforce other laws.’

Having outlined what the case is about, I should also make a comment on what it is not about. The First Minister has made crystal clear, and I repeat that sentiment now, that the Welsh Government respects the result of the referendum and this is absolutely not about overturning that decision.

Whilst the case has, to date, focused on the impact of triggering article 50 on individual rights, the proposed use by the UK Government of the prerogative in this manner is relevant to the legal and constitutional relationship of this Assembly to Parliament. The High Court judgment refers to the European Communities Act 1972 as a ‘statute of major constitutional importance’ and as a result found that it should be

‘exempt from casual implied repeal by Parliament’ or its legal effects removed through the use of prerogative powers. It is beyond doubt that the Government of Wales Act 2006 is also a constitutional statute. The use of Executive powers should not be used to override its provisions unless there is a clear and express statutory basis to do so. The use of the prerogative is not, in my view, a lawful basis either to firstly bring about changes to the competence of this Assembly where compatibility with the European treaties and the law created by them is currently a test of legislative competence, or secondly to bring about changes to the powers of the Welsh Ministers that cannot be exercised in a way incompatible with European Union law. Notification of withdrawal from the treaties on the basis of the case put by the Secretary of State will inevitably therefore bring about changes to the competence of the Assembly and the powers of the Welsh Ministers.

Llywydd, the link between the historical principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the Assembly as a modern, devolved legislature is equally clear. As Parliament has enacted the scheme of devolution in Wales, it should be for Parliament and not the Executive to oversee any changes and to do so with the assent of this elected Assembly. The wider constitutional relationships that have been established and continue to develop should not be bypassed. Indeed, one of the challenges posed by the UK leaving the EU will be to develop more effective relationships between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s rights and responsibilities.