We now reach the debate on the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee report on the scrutiny of regulations made under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. I call on Mick Antoniw, the Chair of the committee, to move the motion. Mick Antoniw.

Motion NDM6680 Mick Antoniw

To propose that the National Assembly for Wales:

1. Notes the report of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee entitled Scrutiny of regulations made under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which was laid in the Table Office on 16 February 2018.

2. Endorses recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 7 of that report, which recommend amendments to the UK Government’s European Union (Withdrawal) Bill.

Motion moved.

Thank you, Llywydd. I can feel the excitement in the air in that you've all waited for this report, and I will do my best not to disappoint. We laid our report on the scrutiny of regulations made under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill on 16 February, and made seven recommendations. Before I talk about our findings, I wanted briefly to explain the context within which this work was undertaken and also set out what we were seeking to achieve.

For clarity, I'd like to rehearse the purpose of the withdrawal Bill, which is to end the supremacy of EU law in UK law and to convert EU law, as it stands at the moment of exit, into domestic law. It also creates temporary powers to make subordinate legislation in the form of regulations that will enable corrections to be made, ensuring that the law operates appropriately once the UK has left the EU. This will enable the domestic legal system to continue to function correctly outside the EU. In order to do this, Members will know that the Bill replaces the framework of the European Communities Act 1972 with a new framework called 'retained EU law', which provides a basis from which the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures can make their own laws. I told you so far I wouldn't disappoint.

The Bill splits retained EU law into three types: EU-derived domestic legislation under clause 2 of the Bill; direct EU legislation under clause 3 of the Bill; and rights, powers, liabilities, et cetera, that arise under the European Communities Act 1972 under clause 4 of the Bill. As currently drafted, the Bill gives the Welsh Ministers powers to amend one type of retained EU law, and that is EU-derived domestic legislation. Now, while the Bill was amended at Report Stage in the House of Commons to allow the Welsh Ministers also to amend direct EU legislation in devolved areas, that power is only exercisable where it has been agreed that a common framework in a particular devolved area is not needed. With regard to making regulations in devolved areas, the Bill includes a complex mix of powers that may be exercised either concurrently or jointly by Welsh Ministers and UK Ministers.

The main aim of our work was to look at the scope and nature of regulation-making powers to be exercised in relation to Wales by the UK Government and the Welsh Ministers, including the procedures to be attached to the scrutiny of those regulations. Our report focuses mainly on amendments we believe should be made to the Bill, and in so doing they address the questions that were raised by the Secretary of State for Wales in a letter to the Llywydd in January of this year, which is available on our website.

Our report was informed by a stakeholder conference held last September, a general consultation and a panel of experts with experience of the making of subordinate legislation. We are grateful to all those who contributed. We also considered the reports of other parliamentary committees in the House of Commons and the House of Lords who examined the making of subordinate legislation on the Bill.

As it is currently drafted, the EU withdrawal Bill has been strongly criticised for the way in which powers to make regulations are to be exercised, with many parliamentary committees from UK legislatures expressing concern at an excessive transfer of power from legislature to government. In particular, this is to be achieved through the use of extensive Henry VIII powers, with the affirmative procedure to be applied in more limited circumstances than would normally be expected.

In some of our initial statements on the implications of legislating to leave the EU, we set out some important constitutional principles that we believe should apply to the role of the National Assembly. These include the National Assembly passing primary legislation in devolved areas, delegating powers to the Welsh Ministers to make subordinate legislation as the National Assembly considers appropriate, and the procedure to be applied to scrutiny of that subordinate legislation.

Now, we recognise that the UK's withdrawal from the EU represents a unique as well as a complex legislative challenge that must be achieved within a short time frame. In these circumstances, and for practical reasons, we accept that the Bill will need to delegate powers to the Welsh Ministers to make subordinate legislation and that, accordingly, it will need to set the procedure attached to those powers. We emphasise that this approach should not be regarded as conceding these important principles or our general concerns about the Bill's approach to devolution, particularly as regards clause 11. Rather, this is a pragmatic response to the scale and the challenge of the unique task ahead to ensure a functioning statute book.

I'd now like to divide the speech into two parts. First, I will consider recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 7, which deal with matters we consider require amendment of the UK Government's Bill and are the subject of point 2 of the motion, and then, secondly, I will consider the other recommendations and their implications for Standing Orders, which will need to be addressed at a later date.

With regard to recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 7, during its passage through the House of Commons, the Bill was amended to apply a sifting mechanism to all regulations to be made under clauses 7, 8 and 9 using the negative procedure, which relate to dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal, complying with international obligations and implementing the withdrawal agreement. Within 10 days of laying, a sifting committee must decide whether the regulation should instead be subject to the affirmative procedure, although any such recommendation is not binding. We believe that the sifting mechanism for the House of Commons now contained within the Bill is a positive step forward, improving the level of scrutiny attached to subordinate legislation to be made under that Bill. Accordingly, recommendation 1 provides that the Bill should be amended to apply the sifting mechanism to all regulations laid before the National Assembly and that a committee here is responsible for making a recommendation as to the appropriate procedure for the regulations.

However, we share the concerns of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the current mechanism within the Bill lacks teeth. Therefore, recommendation 2 requires that the Bill be amended to require that a recommendation of a sifting committee is binding, save where the National Assembly resolves otherwise. This recommendation will ensure that the National Assembly can have the final say as to what procedure will apply to the making of subordinate legislation laid before the National Assembly. This is an important part of ensuring that the sifting mechanism is robust, and I'll come on to explain other ways of ensuring that the sifting mechanism is robust by making changes to our Standing Orders.

However, a sift mechanism, no matter how robust, is no substitute for a clear declaration on the face of the Bill as to when the affirmative procedure must apply. Therefore, we believe that the limited circumstances where the affirmative procedure must apply under the Bill are broadened. Recommendation 4, in effect, says that the Bill should provide for an application of the affirmative procedure in relation to any measure that involves the making of policy, and the affirmative procedure should apply to regulations including those made by the Welsh Ministers under clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17 and Schedule 2 that amend or repeal primary legislation. In our view, the same should apply to regulations made by the Welsh Ministers. Henry VIII powers contained in the Bill should not be used to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006 and that, as a result, the Government of Wales Act 2006 should be included in the list of enactments in clause 7(7) that cannot be amended by regulations. We also believe that the Bill should be amended as set out in recommendation 7, namely that the 'made affirmative' procedure for urgent cases should also apply to regulations made by the Welsh Ministers, whether acting alone or acting with UK Ministers in composite regulations, or acting with UK Ministers in joint regulations, in order for there to be consistent treatment of Ministers of all Governments.

However, we echo the concerns raised by the Hansard Society in respect of the scrutiny procedure that applies in certain urgent cases. These concerns are that the Bill does not impose a statutory duty on the Ministers of the Crown to explain the urgency; that there are no defined limits to the cases, which may or may not be urgent; the sift mechanism can be bypassed completely, again without the Minister of the Crown having to give reasons for bypassing the sift mechanism. We believe there should be safeguards included on the face of the Bill to address each of these concerns.

With regard to recommendations 3, 5 and 6, these concern matters that are related to Standing Orders, and cover matters to be decided at a later date. As I mentioned earlier, the sift mechanism set out in the Bill needs to be more robust. Therefore, we believe that the sifting criteria should be adopted to give clarity to the sifting committee as to what criteria to apply when coming to a decision about what procedure should apply.

Our report details five sifting criteria that we believe should be adopted, and they focus in particular on the need for clarity and transparency in any explanatory material that accompanies the regulations. We believe this will help the sifting committee to come to an informed decision as to what procedure should apply to regulations made under the Bill. A lack of clarity and transparency around things such as what changes are being made, what consultation is being carried out, and what the impact on equality and human rights is will only serve to keep the committee in the dark and make the whole sift mechanism slower and less robust.

Whilst we would prefer the sifting criteria to be included on the face of the Bill, we do not see merit in the Bill setting out detailed criteria that will apply to a sift committee of the National Assembly, while at the same time not setting out such detail in respect of the sift committee of Westminster. Therefore, recommendation 3 says that the sifting criteria should be set out in the National Assembly Standing Orders. Those criteria will then send a clear message as to the kind of information that must be included in explanatory materials that accompany regulations made under the Bill.

Recommendation 1 states that the committee of the National Assembly should be responsible for making the recommendation as to the appropriate procedure for the regulations. Recommendation 5 sets out our view that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, we consider, is the most appropriate committee to perform that task. We have experience and expertise in respect of regulation-making powers, and the various procedures that could apply, through our consideration of Bills introduced for scrutiny in the National Assembly. In addition, we also perform the technical and merit scrutiny of all statutory instruments laid before the National Assembly, in accordance with Standing Order 21. This can often include making judgments on whether the appropriate use of the negative or affirmative procedure has been made by the Welsh Ministers where the parent Act allows a choice of procedure to be made. In our view, this would represent the most efficient and pragmatic approach to dealing with this huge and time-pressured legislative task.

We also made a recommendation, recommendation 6, about applying the sifting mechanism to categories of regulations that we describe in the report. One of these categories concerns regulations made by UK Ministers acting alone. Using the broad powers they are given, they could make regulations in devolved areas. This could lead to regulations of the kind the National Assembly sees on a day-to-day basis being laid before the UK Parliament only. Not only that, but the UK Ministers could also use their broad powers to affect the legislative competence of the National Assembly. Executive action could lead to changes in the scope of the Assembly's legislative competence. The constitutional impropriety of this approach we consider to be clear. So, while such regulations will not be laid before the Assembly, we believe that the sift committee at the National Assembly should be given some role in the scrutiny of regulations made by UK Ministers in devolved areas that are laid before the UK Parliament. At the very least, that sift committee should be made aware of any such regulations at the same time as the House of Commons sifting committee is made aware of them. The National Assembly committee can then make representations to, or advise the House of Commons committee where appropriate.

Our report also highlights that other operational matters will need to be considered, particularly in terms of how a sift committee of the National Assembly will need to work with a sift committee of the House of Commons, where regulations are made by the Welsh and UK Ministers acting concurrently.

Our report was published before the Welsh Government's own continuity Bill was introduced in the Assembly. We are taking evidence from the Cabinet Secretary on the Bill next Monday. One of the issues we'll seek to explore with him is whether the Welsh Government intends to have access to regulation-making powers made available to the Welsh Ministers in both Bills and the merits of such an approach. Thank you.

Can I thank the Chair of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, Mick Antoniw, for outlining things so clearly? Can I just say to Members that there are times when the seemingly obscure is actually of vital importance, and this is one of them? I just want to underline one or two things that Mick has said because there is, obviously, no need to add to the description of the situation that we now find ourselves in.

The EU withdrawal Bill is a remarkable Bill, and it changes, obviously, completely our relationship to Europe, but also the devolution settlement. How we manage all that is of vital importance, and it is really important that we have a sifting mechanism. That's obviously the central recommendation here, and it will mirror the likely practice now in Westminster to govern the administration, then, of ministerial powers there. But we need to do the same over devolved issues. I think, as members of CLAC realise, it's probably CLAC that will have to do that work. So, we are making this recommendation to you, but we're also saying that we are prepared to do the work.

It's very important that the decision of a sifting committee should be binding. Most of the time, the recommendations that the Ministers make are going to be accepted. We're talking about a vast number of items that can come through on secondary powers—500 or 600, I think, have been mentioned. So, the number of statutory instruments are going to be very, very large.

So, accepting the wide-ranging regulation powers that Ministers must have, the appropriate check and balance here is a sift mechanism. If we don't have a sift mechanism, there's a real danger, however inadvertently, of a significant shift of power from the legislature to Ministers. I'm sure that the Welsh Government don't want that. So, this suggestion is a very practical way forward.

On some points, I think any use of Henry VIII powers should require, at the very least, an affirmative procedure. That's a very important principle, but in general, it's difficult to see how our duty to scrutinise can really work effectively unless we have this check and balance and have a sift mechanism. Thank you.

I can see the Chamber is energised by this debate, but it is, actually—as the Chair of CLAC outlined—fundamentally very important. We are discussing the EU withdrawal Bill—most of the EU withdrawal Bill. I know we've been discussing, in recent weeks, the parts that are involving devolved areas and stuff, but this is the large body of the EU withdrawal Bill itself. We've debated the power grab, we've debated legislative competence motions and, obviously, the continuity Bill, which has appeared since this excellent report was produced. Can I commend both the leadership of the Chair and also the hard work of our clerks, researchers and our legal support, who have been tremendous over the last few weeks, certainly when we've been producing report after report?

You'll recall that last week we had a CLAC debate on inter-governmental relations, which was predicated on the need for all of the legislators in these islands to regard one another with equal respect and equal parity. What we've got in front of us today is the latest attempt by this National Assembly to make sure that our voice is heard equally with other similar committees in other legislatures. Yes, we're working together with the similar committees in the House of Lords at Westminster and the Scottish equivalent, but it is, at the end of the day, about parity of legislatures and respect all round, not just getting some powers, somebody else decides what we're dealt with, and we just have to get on with it. This is a meaningful attempt to do something about it and to try and influence the way things are happening. Because there's a power grab possible here, as David Melding was outlining, the power grab being two Ministers from the legislature here now not losing powers from this place, although that is in the background, obviously, still an inherent threat, which is why we have all these other mechanisms happening. I would reiterate what we decided last week: to support a reformed joint ministerial council and also a Speakers' conference as regards the way forward. I can see the Counsel General nodding enthusiastically, which I welcome.

Now, in terms of the sift mechanism, which is the central contribution here, we have to have a way of dealing with around 600-plus extra pieces of legislation just coming our way, and, really, we have to have some control over that, and that control is the sift mechanism, which is in those recommendations that I heartily recommend to everybody following our Chair's lead. But also, it's not just going to be a rubber-stamping exercise. A committee here—and we suggest in recommendation 5 that it is actually the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee—does that sifting, which is also an active process, to make sure, as David Melding outlined, that regulation-making powers must not be used to shift the balance of power excessively towards governments and away from legislatures, as we outlined and he outlined. Because there's a danger, in trying to be quick and expedient because you've got so much to deal with, that we just give it all to the relevant Ministers without any involvement of the National Assembly for Wales. That is not right. That's why we need a sifting committee.

The same thing about regulation-making powers—the old Henry VIII powers that we debate most weeks in the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee. I have to say to David Melding, I think Henry VIII represents one of his golden ages; the 1920s is another one. The 1540s is another one. But there is a very inherent danger with Henry VIII powers, because basically we need to be able to scrutinise the performance of those as well, rather than we just have Ministers of the Crown imposing their views on this legislature without us as a legislature being able to do anything about it. So, any imposition of Henry VIII powers must be clearly defined and at least be subject to the affirmative procedure as outlined here. That is a long-standing view of CLAC, by the way; it's not just here directed towards this particular situation.

So, it's an expansive report. It's a coherent way of dealing with the large amount of legislation that is going to come our way. This is a coherent way of dealing with it, and I wholeheartedly recommend the report, and I wholeheartedly also expect, and hopefully will see realised, the unanimous support of this Chamber. Diolch yn fawr.

Can I first of all thank the Chair of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee for a very detailed presentation of the report and the arguments as to why we need to support that. We are talking about the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, clearly—something that may not happen, depending on what happens in the weeks ahead of us. But it is important that we get this right, because whichever Bill we end up with, we need to ensure we have the proper scrutiny process for that particular Bill.

The External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee did look at the EU withdrawal Bill in quite some detail as well, and we had some shared sessions with the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee on this. But we put forward amendments to the EU withdrawal Bill to Members of Parliament, and they were all accepted and all taken forward by Members of Parliament in the Committee Stage. Unfortunately, none of them were accepted by the Government. But we highlighted at that stage six objectives, one of them being to ensure powers available to Welsh Ministers under the Bill are strictly limited, and far more tightly drawn than those currently set out in the Bill. Because we recognise the important need to have the Ministers accountable to this legislature and not to be have the wide and broad-ranging powers that the Bill was proposing. As has been mentioned, Henry VIII powers are very wide, and very often negative procedures. We did not agree with that. We had to ensure that Welsh Ministers were accountable to this institution, and that we were able to restrict their powers in that sense. I would recognise that CLAC has the same views and concerns on that as many, by the way, have expressed in other committees across the Commons and across the Lords. So, that's not new, but we focused upon that. 

We also highlighted that objective 6 was to ensure that the Assembly can set its own scrutiny arrangements, which I think is very crucial. It's acknowledged by the powers provided to the Assembly by the Government of Wales Act 2006 that it's for the Assembly alone, as the democratically accountable institution for Wales, to set its own procedures. That's an important fact that we should remember. The Bill, as it is drafted, actually, would undermine that constitutional aspect by seeking to set, on behalf of us as the Assembly, the procedures that will apply to scrutiny of secondary legislation. I appreciate the sifting mechanism that's put in place—that actually doesn't take that away from us—in the Bill; that's still there. So, we need to address that and we highlighted this. The withdrawal Bill does seek to impose procedure on us, as an Assembly, without any consultation. And, in the absence of acknowledging our view expressed in our report on the White Paper, the Government was going ahead with that.

Professor John Bell, in written evidence to the committee, said that 

'The provisions on Scrutiny are inadequate...The Bill does not recognise the magnitude of the task and therefore the need to have differently designed procedures to ensure adequate scrutiny...The Bill assumes current procedures will be used, but that is simply not possible. Very serious attention needs to be given to how scrutiny will operate.' 

I appreciate very much the work done by CLAC to look at those aspects of scrutiny, because we were deeply concerned about how we, as an institution, would be able to scrutinise secondary legislation that was going through Parliament in particular, which affected devolved competency, but we would have no ability to comment upon it.

The Institute of Welsh Affairs gave us written evidence:

'Corresponding powers are conferred on devolved institutions by clause 10 and schedule 2, meaning that Welsh Government Ministers could also take Henry VIII powers under this Bill should they wish. It would of course be unsatisfactory to see this power replicated in Wales, without action to rebalance the scrutiny mechanisms available...Defects in parliamentary scrutiny ought not to be replicated in Cardiff.'

So, this Bill needs to be amended. This report needs to be supported to ensure that we are making the message quite clear that the devolved institutions should have the right to set their own scrutiny procedures and we should also follow the example of the sifting mechanism, and allow a committee to take on the task when there is a negative procedure, to assess that particular item of secondary legislation. So, I fully ask Members to support the motion.

First I would like thank the Chair of the committee, the Assembly Member for Pontypridd, for his work on this report. I’d also like to thank all of the team that supports the committee for all their efforts in this regard and, finally, my fellow committee members whom, I know, have put a lot of time, effort and thought into this report.

My contribution today is going to be relatively short, as I have to agree with a lot of what my fellow committee members have already contributed to this report and to this debate. The part of the report that I would like to highlight, because I do feel it is of great importance, is the sifting mechanism for the House of Commons now contained within this Bill. It is a positive step towards improving the level of scrutiny attached to subordinate legislation to be made under the Bill.

I hope all Members would agree that, from the evidence gathered in this report, it is clear that the same sifting mechanism should apply here at the National Assembly. This report recommends that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee should be the sifting committee for the Assembly. It is something that we, as committee, have discussed in great depth and find it would be the most pragmatic approach to dealing with the anticipated volume of subordinate legislation to come before this institution. Thank you.

Thank you. Can I now call the leader of the house, Julie James?

Thank you, Deputy Presiding Officer. I want to start also by thanking the committee for examining the scrutiny of regulations to be made under the powers contained in the UK Government's European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. 

The Welsh Government has not yet had an opportunity to formally respond to the report, which was only published a couple of weeks ago. However, we completely understand why the committee has been so keen to debate this report and its recommendations in the Senedd, as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill continues to make progress through the House of Lords. The Government will be supporting the motion today, but with one qualification, which I will come to.

We've consistently been clear about our concerns about the breadth and scope of the delegated powers contained within the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The proposed amendments that we published jointly with the Scottish Government included provisions that would remove the various restrictions placed on the Welsh Ministers' regulation-making powers in that Bill. Our amendments would have brought the powers of Welsh Ministers into line with those of the UK Ministers, as a large number of people have pointed out during the debate earlier. We were also clear that we would support proposals to narrow their scope and improve the scrutiny requirements attached to them, so we entirely agree with all of the remarks made about the transfer of powers, and that point has been well made by everybody who's contributed today.

We therefore welcome the amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that provide for a sifting committee, and we agree with the committee's first recommendation for the sifting mechanism to cover all regulations made under the Bill and for them to be laid before the Assembly.

We are reserving our position on the committee's second recommendation, which states that all the sifting committees' recommendations should be binding. I have listened very carefully to the arguments and we haven't yet formally responded, so I'm not saying we're not saying that, but we are currently reserving our position while we consider thoroughly what all the consequences of that might be. Because we believe that in the vast majority of cases Welsh Ministers will accept the recommendation of the sifting committee that a set of regulations should be subject to the affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure, for example—whatever the outcome of that sift might be. However, we think there may be situations where, for reasons of urgency, for example, Welsh Ministers will need to act more quickly than the affirmative procedure provides for, and it's essential that Government retains the flexibility to do so, notwithstanding the recommendations of the sifting committee. I also believe there's a case for maintaining consistent arrangements between the National Assembly and the UK Parliament, particularly for joint and composite instruments where both the Assembly's and Parliament's sifting committees would be making recommendations on the appropriate procedures. In certain circumstances it's possible that UK Ministers might, for legitimate reasons, disregard the recommendation of their sifting committee, but Welsh Ministers might not be able to do so if we accepted that recommendation. We want to think about it. We want to reflect on that further as we respond formally to the report.

I want to reiterate that we welcome scrutiny. The Law Derived from the European Union (Wales) Bill includes more rigorous procedures for the scrutiny of delegated powers than the EU withdrawal Bill does. This demonstrates our commitment to providing the Assembly with the right tools to scrutinise how Welsh Ministers use their delegated powers. But we must strike the right balance between the Assembly's scrutiny role and the need for the Executive to be able to respond quickly and flexibly to what is likely to be a fast-moving and fast-changing legislative landscape as we approach Brexit. Making the sifting mechanism recommendations binding will not strike this balance, in our view. [Interruption.] Of course.

It is a check and balance, and you will be making all the initial recommendations, which will then be sifted. Also, all this work is going to be done well before exit day, so I'm not quite sure there's the level of urgency, certainly at the volume you are anticipating, and I don't think it's going to be the action of the sift committee to make many calls. It will just be where we really think that something should, in effect, go from negative to affirmative.

Yes, I take that, but I think we want to reflect a little bit more on that as we go forward. So, as I say, we're taking it under advisement rather than rejecting it outright at this stage, which is why we are supporting the report overall.

So, in respect of the committee's recommendations 4 and 7, we agree with the amendments set out in paragraphs 44 to 46 of the committee's report, and we agree that the provisional affirmative procedure should be available for regulations made by Welsh Ministers.

Turning briefly to the remaining recommendations, we agree that the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee should act as the sifting committee, but we believe the Assembly may need to consider whether there should be any change to the committee's current arrangements to enable it to deal with the level of the work.

Turning to recommendation 3, the sifting committee will need to agree the criteria by which it performs the sifting process. It will be important that these criteria, and any changes to Standing Orders, are consistent with the final framework for the sifting mechanism that is set out in the Bill. To be fair, the Chair of the committee made that point very forcefully, I thought. We're not yet persuaded that the criteria should be included in Standing Orders. We believe we should return to this matter once the final sifting mechanism is agreed. So, again, this is one of those complex weaves where we try to make several pieces of legislation and our Standing Orders and procedures all line up together.

Finally, we're minded to agree with recommendation 6, which sets out the categories of regulation to which the sifting mechanism should apply. We do however note the potential logistical challenges in respect of joint and composite regulations, where both the Assembly and the UK parliamentary sifting committees will be engaged.

So, overall, we very much welcome the report, we're very grateful for the work that the committee's put in, and we will be supporting the motion overall. But, as I said earlier in my response, we'll reserve our position on recommendation 2. Diolch.

Thank you. Can I now call on Mick Antoniw to reply to the debate?

Firstly, thank you to all those who've contributed and spent time going through the detail of this report. I welcome, again, my fellow committee members on this, who've worked very hard in very narrow time frames, and also the staff, who've also done that as well. And it's fair to say this is probably one of the most boring, geeky reports that will ever come before this Chamber. [Laughter.] But it is also one of the most vitally important reports dealing with the whole issue of the balance of powers and the rule of law emanating from this Chamber. And here we are, 500 years on, and we're still blaming Henry VIII for an awful lot.

Can I thank Dai Rees, also, for his comments and also for the joint co-operation we've had in a number of areas, looking at these common areas? I think that has actually been very much invaluable.

I welcome the comments that have been made by the Government, but I make this particular point, that one of the reasons why the motion is in this format, in terms of endorsement, is because of the specific invitation by the UK Government to actually consider a number of these points of amendments with regard to scrutiny. So, there was a particular window of opportunity that had to be responded to, but also it would not be appropriate for us as a committee to be making recommendations of that type that at least did not have the endorsement of this Chamber. And of course, in all these matters, the ultimate principle is this, and I welcome very much the comments made by the Government and the fact that they will reflect on these very important issues, because this has to be something that is workable. But, when it comes to the exercise of governmental power and the scrutiny of that, the issue of scrutiny is a matter, ultimately, for this Chamber, not for Government. It is not for Government to set the rules for its own scrutiny. Ultimately, the rule of law requires that the scrutiny is by this Assembly, and that's why I believe this report is robust, but I welcome the positive response that has been received and from Members. Thank you.

Thank you. The proposal is to agree the motion. Does any Member object? No. Therefore, the motion is agreed in accordance with Standing Order 12.36.

Motion agreed in accordance with Standing Order 12.36.