The Miller judgment was very clear that the Sewel convention was not be justiciable, could not be the basis of the claim in court. But it was also very clear that it had the strongest possible political weight, apart from being available as a basis of a claim. And as I mentioned in my answer to a previous question, the Supreme Court regarded that as a permanent feature of the devolution settlement. Before the Sewel convention was enshrined in statute, it had been used about 100 times, I think—the requests that had been made to this Chamber—and they had not been disregarded by the UK Parliament when the Government in the UK accepted that consent was required. So, the strength of the Sewel convention is well established. 

The point she makes in relation to the consent decision—the language in the amendment refers to a consent decision, i.e. the point at which this Assembly or the Scottish Parliament makes a decision whether to consent or not to consent. That is about the timetabling of how the Ministers in Westminster can submit regulations there. It is absolutely clear in the inter-governmental agreement that regulations will be subject to the Sewel convention, i.e. that the UK Parliament will not normally seek to legislate other than with the consent of this place.