Thank you, Dirprwy Lywydd. If I could deal, at the outset, with the issues raised by David Rees and Bethan Sayed, first of all, in relation to the agreement situation, he's correct about that. We will look at how the Assembly receives reports as quickly as possible. I think that's in everybody's interests. Of course, there are issues that have been raised today that are more properly dealt with when the Trade Bill is looked at, and are outside the purview of the withdrawal Bill. And, of course, more work will need to be done on inter-governmental machinery, but the fact that there is an inter-governmental agreement now, for the first time ever, is a sign that that machinery can be shown to work.

In response to what Bethan Sayed said, I can say that state aid we do not agree is something that should be reserved to the UK Government. There are two outstanding issues that are not yet agreed: one is the nature of state aid, and whether that is devolved or not; the other is food geographical indication. So, we are not in agreement with the UK Government that state aid should be something that sits entirely within their purview, or something that necessarily should sit within the larder, freezer, call it what you will.

Well, Llywydd, can I say, first of all, that reaching agreement with the UK Government to protect devolution from the juggernaut of their Brexit policies was always going to require determination, as well as give and take, but I do sometimes wonder whether there is a full understanding of what this agreement actually says. In essence, it deals with all the problems that were identified with the original withdrawal Bill. As others in this Chamber have said quite properly, originally, the UK Government was not prepared to concede anything on clause 11, and all 64 policy areas would have sat in Westminster, with no guarantees as to when those powers would have been released to the devolved administrations, and what would, in effect, have been an indefinite sunset clause.

The Bill originally reserved to the UK Government a whole raft of devolved matters after we left the EU, and the original Bill would undoubtedly have been the most fundamental attack on devolution since the establishment of the National Assembly. But the agreement has removed that threat. It represents a major step forward, which anyone who believes in devolution should embrace. It protects devolution as fully as possible as we grapple with the endless and chaotic consequences of Brexit, and I'll spell out the key reasons, including the protections we have secured.

Firstly, and hugely importantly, what we see now is an agreement that confirms the inversion of clause 11. I don't think anyone can underplay how significant a change that is. It shows the UK Government has come a long way from its original position, that clause 11 was something that could not be interfered with in any way. It confirms that everything is devolved, except for a specific category of matters—it's a reserved-powers model, effectively, in its inversion—where we agree that UK frameworks are needed.

Now, the original proposal would have retained all EU powers over devolved policy areas at Westminster. Ministers of the Crown would then release them as and when they alone determined. That was the original proposal. That's now reversed. Powers over devolved policy areas will be held in Cardiff and Edinburgh, except for framework areas, which will be covered by a set of detailed restrictions that apply to all governments. That is important, and I will return to that.