Thank you, Deputy Presiding Officer. I'm very pleased to reply to the debate and I'd like to thank everyone who has taken part in it.

I think that one of the weaknesses of the Assembly, one of the criticisms we've had, is that we tend to be very inward looking and not prepared to learn from outside. I think this is an example of where we are looking at what's happened, what's gone wrong, outside and learning the lessons from it, and I think that really is important, because, if we don't learn the lessons from what happens not just over the border, but throughout Europe as well, in some of these things, then we can end up repeating the mistakes.

Lee Waters—I'm very pleased that he brought the reports of the House of Commons on Carillion and Capita to the attention of the Assembly. I doubt if many people would have read them if he hadn't brought them to the attention of the Assembly, and I think that, in itself, is very helpful. And we need to learn lessons. We've seen two very large companies having problems, but why? Carillion seemed to engage in this 'dash for cash', as it was described by Lee Waters, and it was unsustainable. It had to be unsustainable when you were chasing capital from the next contract to pay for the current one.

Capita—well, I'll come to what Dai Lloyd said earlier, but I think Lee Waters summed it up with 'a lack of understanding', 'botched delivery'. We have to learn lessons from the report. Procurement is not just about putting out a contract, getting the lowest price coming in and then letting them have it and hoping it works. Because, a lot of the time, it doesn't and I think, with very large contracts, you end up being sucked into paying more and more money as the contract goes on, because you can't get out of it, because it's so important.

Dai Lloyd explained Capita and GP practices and the rest of primary care far better than I could, but I think that one thing he did explain is how amazingly complex it was, and people without experience of the complexity were bidding for contracts, winning contracts, and then saying, 'Oh dear'. Dai Lloyd knows because he was on the council, I think at the same time as me, or had just left it to come here—we had Capgemini coming in, who couldn't even produce a payroll system, as other Members here who lived in Swansea or worked for the council at the time can lay out. It couldn't produce a payroll system for our council, despite bidding for it.

We have outsources that are a predictable failure. These things go wrong with a level of regularity that you might think people might have learnt lessons from. NHS England and Capita—they misjudged the risk. Sometimes, people are bidding for things that they don't quite understand. I remember once seeing, in a computer book, that it said that somebody wanted a swing, and, after it had gone through all the different changes of the design process, it ended up with a swing that wouldn't swing, which was fixed and was unable to be sat on, but it had just gone through all the different design procedures. A lot of this seems to happen with the outsourced contracts.

Jenny Rathbone went through Capita and its role in assessing attendance allowances. Well, I'm sure that there's not a person in here who couldn't go through the problems they've had with Capita and the attendance allowances. But she went on, more importantly, to auditors and auditing. And there is a problem. There are three major companies for which auditing is only one part of their income; they do lots of best-value work and other benefits to the company. When it becomes that important to you as a company, because of the amount of money you're getting from the additional work you're doing, how keen are you on making sure that you pick up all the warts in the auditing system, when, if you get sacked as an auditor, then you're in serious problems? The same independent auditor for 19 years—I mean, that is ridiculous. Anybody who has been involved with charitable and voluntary organisations has been told, after having the same auditor, many of them local people they know, for three or five years, 'You need to change your auditor'. If that's what you tell small organisations dealing with relatively small sums of money, why a public company can have the same auditor for 19 years—. You've got to develop a cosy relationship.

I think Neil Hamilton came out with the failure of the Westminster Government, the failure of the regulator, leads—it's basically a systemic failure. It takes me back to thinking of PFI. The people who proved PFI was value for money—it took a genius to do that, because you were borrowing money at a higher and a higher level, you were paying out money for almost the rest of time, you had contracts that had payments for everything from £30 to change a lightbulb right the way through. But somebody would do a calculation, and, if it didn't come out with the right answer, you were sent back to try again. I think that, too often, we answer first and then we work back to what the question should be. And a lot of that has happened here.

Again, Carillion funding via debt—when the biggest part on your sheet is goodwill, which is twice as much as you've got in cash—. One of the things I did bring in, when I was working for the council—for some small organisations that were council run, I asked them, 'Can we have the cash flow?' In which case, I was told that it wasn't really helpful. 'You don't really want to see that; you want to see the accounts. The accounts give you a true and accurate record. You don't want to see cash flow, because that gives you an inaccurate—it varies.' Well, I said, 'Can I have it for every month for 12 months? Because it's bound to go up and down. It's bound to be right some of the time, and, after 12 months, it can't be that much out.' Because people put things into stock, and they value stock. There are all these little tricks that accountants know in order to make sure that money is not lost. 

Failure of privatisation—Mick Antoniw was absolutely right. Should we be promoting social partnership? It's too much about competition between you trying to get the best deal, and them trying. How about working together?

I think Mark Drakeford talked about learning lessons from elsewhere. Beware of a pursuit of something that is both unrealistic and unachievable in terms of savings, but somebody tells you they can do it. Capita is a cautionary tale. It was not equipped to achieve what it meant to. Carillion, aggressive at chasing contracts—I was very pleased with the 10 lessons Mark Drakeford put out. I would have thought they would be a very good Government statement, at some time, of the lessons that we need, or rules we need, or procurement rules or lessons we need to—. Because I think it is important that we get it right, we learn from what's gone wrong. We don't want to repeat it.