I think, at the outset of the debate, it is worth reiterating how disastrous a 'no deal' scenario would be. It's of course difficult to predict with absolute certainty the consequences of a scenario that, by definition, is as yet unspecified in all its permutations. But I think it's reasonable to come to a conclusion about the nature of the impacts on the economy, and in the short to medium term they are three fold—a financial crisis, a trade shock and a domestic recession that is likely to be both deep and long.

In terms of the financial markets, the pound is already down some 20 per cent since the referendum, without the kind of UK-wide export boom that some predicted. UK equities, not including foreign-focused firms listed in the UK, are unattractive. Jobs and investment are heading abroad, with about £800 billion of staff operations and customer funds already moved abroad from the financial sector alone, according to a recent report by Ernst & Young. Indeed, on our recent visit to the Republic of Ireland, in a meeting with the Irish development agency, the IDA—of course, they are living proof of what might be coming further down the line. Fifty-five companies have already located, of course, to the Republic of Ireland, even without the horrendous prospect of a 'no deal'.

So, on 30 March, in a crash-out scenario, I think we can expect a rapid and radical worsening of these already existing trends. The pound would tumble probably at least a further 20 per cent to parity with the dollar. There'd be widespread concern about the UK's financial stability, accompanied by a frantic outflow of capital, and a whole range of financial institutions would be likely severely tested in echoes of 2008, but with the added dimension that both the UK and global economies are in a more fragile state than then and have far less capacity to respond positively. The strong likelihood is that the Bank of England would have to raise interest rates sharply to try and maintain confidence.

Now, in terms of the real economy, domestic-facing businesses will probably not be that hard hit on day 1, though one would anticipate a general slowing down in economic activity, given the financial uncertainties, the fall of the pound and the rise in interest rates, which will quickly induce a negative mood in general in terms of confidence in the economy. By contrast, though, the impact on the tradable goods sector is likely to be sudden and explosive. Every cross-border transaction will be affected. Indeed, whole new borders will be created where they previously didn't exist in the commercial sense. Red tape, delays, chaos and confusion will fatally undermine the very basis of much of UK just-in-time manufacturing. One can envisage company shutdowns and cash flow problems kicking in very quickly, given the scale of change and uncertainty. For services, again, the likelihood is almost certainly one of severe disruption and threats to the survival of some companies, and further catalysts for the relocation of others. How many jobs would be lost in the first few months is not accurately calculable, but the likelihood is that these would be substantial and, for the most part, gone for good.      

Now, looking beyond the first few weeks and months, it is true that in the long run those crises usually sort themselves out eventually. However, I think it's likely that, in this case, such is the depth of the impact in certain sectors, particularly the car industry, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, farming, probably finance, I think it would leave a long shadow of economic decline for many, many years to come. And because Wales has a higher concentration in most of these sectors, we would likely suffer disproportionately from a 'no deal' scenario. A major recession in the country will almost certainly be unavoidable. The huge hit to industry, allied to rising prices and rising interest rates, will leave people much poorer, struggling to make ends meet. Domestic-facing companies that will likely avoid the initial chaos would then be hit by probably the most severe depression the country will have known for many, many years. Of course, any of the individual assumptions behind the predictions I've made are contestable, I could be wrong. The question is: is it a risk worth taking? And most of us here, I think, would argue 'no'—a 'no deal' is unacceptable and it is unnecessary.

But it, of course, brings us on to the very pertinent question of how do we avoid it. Now, the Government has already said it supports the extension of article 50, and we welcome that. And praise where praise is due—it's ahead of the Labour Party in Westminster in this regard, who, at this stage, only say that extending article 50 is an option worth considering. What I would say to that, and we've heard the language of options in the Brexit debate in other contexts, haven't we, that famous—? I almost feel as if I was in that compositing-motion-room discussion, because we've heard it referred to in terms of the Labour Party conference so often. Time is running out for options. Actually, what we need now is a clear sense of a strategy and what action are we going to take.

So, I would urge the Government, now that it's adopted this position of asking for an urgent extension of article 50, if it could convey that message to its parliamentary colleagues in Westminster, then they would be doing us all a great favour. And, I think that, obviously, in the motion before Christmas, on 4 December, we voted against Mrs May's deal. I hope that in this motion today, this Parliament will vote against a 'no deal' Brexit. We've been influential—obviously, we led the way in terms of Mrs May's deal. I hope that we lead the way in terms of a 'no deal' as well and the Parliament in Westminster will also follow our lead.

But, you know, saying what we're against is only part of the solution. The next part is saying what we're for, and, ultimately, the only way of absolutely ensuring there is no 'no deal' is for us to find a positive majority in this place, obviously, but also in that other Parliament, in favour of an alternative. But that is a discussion for another day, and by that, of course, I mean next Tuesday.