Part of the debate – in the Senedd at 4:36 pm on 13 March 2019.
Diolch, Llywydd. I've retabled this amendment from Stage 2, as I wish to seek reassurance from the Member in charge that the ombudsman will take the Nolan principles into consideration when his office is undertaking investigations into complaints against public bodies.
As I outlined at Stage 2, while the ombudsman can also view the Nolan principles as overriding, he is unable to hold public bodies to account via the principles, as evidenced within correspondence I've received from a member of the public. In his responses to that member of the public, the ombudsman stated
'I recognise that you have framed your complaint with reference to the Nolan principles but the Ombudsman, whilst obviously recognising that adherence to these principles is necessary for higher standards in public services, would not, given his role and their general nature, use them to determine complaints about public bodies.'
He also stated:
'So I hope this provides an explanation of our approach and the context in which we operate. It is not that Nolan is inapplicable, more that our interest is in ensuring administrative justice to the people of Wales is not best served by simply restricting or satisfying ourselves by these overriding principles alone.'
As I outlined at Stage 2, these two statements do appear to be a contradiction. The Welsh Government also abides by the Nolan principles, as do elected Members in public office. Publicly employed individuals may also be accountable to Nolan principles, but there's no recourse for complainants to use the principles, other than through the expensive and cumbersome route of judicial review. It is not that these should be overriding principles, but that they should be integral.
Furthermore, the Nolan principles are summed up thus: the ombudsman provides no alternative set of principles, yet, in judging issues such as good standards of administration to determine complaints about public bodies, it is important to judge against an accepted standard of reference. The Nolan principles, we contend, provide that standard. They were established for that purpose. Among other things, they meet the criteria of law produced by the UK Government Committee on Standards in Public Life; they set a UK-wide benchmark; they apply to all in public life—officials and elected representatives; they're endorsed by the Welsh Government, not least in statutory instruments; and they're endorsed by the standards committee of Welsh councils.
The ombudsman claims that the Nolan principles are general. They're not. Principles are guides, they're not intended to be detailed instructions. The Nolan principles are very clear and specifically designed to be relevant to the public sector. The ombudsman claims that placing the principles on the face of the Bill serves as an unhelpful detraction from the existing powers he has to investigate maladministration. Yet, there still remains a gap in how he will determine whether public bodies will be held to account through the principles.
For instance, while he notes that there is a very wide power of maladministration, which allows him to take into account the Nolan principles, conversely, the power means that he also does not have to take them into account. Since I argued the case for the Nolan principles at Stage 2 of the Bill, I've been made increasingly aware of concerns that some public sector bodies and their employees are distorting their interpretation of the Nolan principles when applied to themselves. Further, where allegations regarding the conduct of officers are integral to the wider complaint submitted to the public services ombudsman, we've too often seen ombudsman reports quoting lines to justify their decision not to uphold the complaint that can be identified as having come from the same officers, actually matching, word for word, letters received directly from the local authority and signed by the same officers.
Elected members can be referred to the ombudsman on alleged breaches of the code of conduct, but the ombudsman cannot investigate complaints against officers. That is right. Instead, these are left to local authorities to determine as their employer. However, complaints to the ombudsman regarding public bodies frequently relate to matters that are set in the context of conduct by officers. Although the subject of the complaint cannot be objectively investigated without wider consideration of any context relating to the conduct of officers, in accordance with the Nolan principles, we instead see cases where, as quoted, the ombudsman would not use the Nolan principles to determine complaints.
It is welcome that the updated explanatory memorandum to the Bill now includes the Nolan principles and explains that the ombudsman and vested authorities are required to have due regard to the principles in carrying out their work. However, given the concerns I've listed, I'd be grateful for confirmation from the Member in charge of how, in the absence of the principles on the face of the Bill, he expects to ensure that the ombudsman takes the Nolan principles into account when investigating any and every complaint that does, directly or indirectly, involve the conduct of the officers involved with that complaint. Thank you.