Section 7, firstly, provides Welsh Ministers with the power to use the regulations to amend the list of permitted payments. The power is a Henry VIII power, as it will enable section 1 to be amended by subordinate legislation. The objective behind the regulation-making powers is to enable regulations to reflect any unforeseen changes in landlord behaviour and practice, and the Welsh Ministers are not permitted to remove the payments of rent from the categories of permitted payment. So, the established practice has been to seek the use of affirmative procedure for any subordinate legislation that would change primary legislation, and, for that reason, the CLAC committee welcomed that the Minister has, from the outset, drafted the Bill so that the affirmative procedure will be used for regulations made under section 7. So, I do acknowledge the strength of the drafting in that respect.

However, the committee also agreed that these regulations, which should enable the list of permitted payments to be altered—or would enable them to be altered—would benefit from the additional security that the superaffirmative procedure would allow: so, from affirmative to superaffirmative in this respect. Given that the Minister has committed to full engagement with stakeholders, I do not believe that placing this commitment in statute through a superaffirmative procedure would be onerous. This view is also influenced by the Minister's reliance, and, indeed, the Welsh Government's wider reliance, on the basic 'consult where appropriate' approach, but this approach lacks transparency—it's up to the Minister; we're not setting the terms—and may not instil confidence in those who will be affected by the changes that can be made through regulations. So, the power to amend the definition of a 'permitted payment' could alter the effect of the overall aim of the Bill as currently drafted or, by shortening the list of permitted payments, widen the number of criminal offences created by the Bill—very significant things.

Key stakeholders and relevant Assembly committees should have the opportunity to comment on draft regulations that would change a significant element of the legislation. The CLAC committee—. And I believe the regulations should be made via superaffirmative procedure—so, I agree with CLAC committee on that—which requires the Welsh Government to consult the stakeholders in advance of laying the regulations before the National Assembly. The period of consultation would also provide time for the relevant Assembly committees to consider the regulations in draft form. So, it significantly strengthens an affirmative procedure by requiring that level of consultation on the draft. So, I think it's very significant.

Section 13, on the other hand, enables an authorised officer of a local housing authority to give an individual a fixed-penalty notice if that officer believes the individual has committed an offence under sections 2 or 3 of the Bill. The amount of fixed penalty is, as of Stage 2, £1,000. Section 13 subsection 3 provides the Welsh Ministers with a power to use regulations to amend the level of fixed-penalty notice, and this power is a Henry VIII power, as it will enable section 13 to be amended by subordinate legislation. And, as in section 7, the CLAC committee—and, again, I agree with them—believe that section 13 regulations should be made under the superaffirmative procedure, which ensures key stakeholders will be consulted before the amount of the fixed penalty is changed. They consistently argue this when you impose a penalty and then change that penalty significantly. So, my amendment ensures that any regulations made under Schedule 1 paragraph 2(4) of the Bill are subject to the affirmative procedure.

In essence, I think these are important changes, potentially, to what is currently on the face of the legislation and requires wide consultation both with stakeholders and with the relevant committees. So, if a future Government wanted to increase the fixed penalty from £1,000 to £5,000, for instance, that, clearly, would be of huge significance, and to consult with letting agents and landlords on what they thought about that and, indeed, what tenants thought about it, would be key to ensuring that such a change—a dramatic change, really, in practice—was fully tested. As I said in response to the Minister's rebuttal to this point in Stage 2, when a Government Minister says—and, Members, wake up to this—'We do not believe that x, y and z would be a good use of your scrutiny time'—so, listen to the Government and be dictated to by the Government as to what scrutiny the legislature requires—you need to run a mile from the Government's advice. It is not impartial. I think it's fair for us to decide. If we want to invest that time in the scrutiny process, we should decide. And, as I said, when it comes to the level of fines, that is very, very significant.

This is not something that I'm suggesting casually; I've referred to the CLAC report throughout, which is itself highly selective, and, indeed, we do praise the practice where that's applied as well. The Government has listened and adopted it in many places, the affirmative procedure, but there are occasions when superaffirmative, which allows much fuller consultation—and I have to say, somehow, the Government is immediately disabled for consulting with tenants because it needs to use a superaffirmative procedure, whereas, if it's a private Government procedure that it determines, it's somehow magically enabled to consult with all the tenants at once, but, as soon as that's a public, statutory commitment, somehow it's compromised. Frankly, I don't think it's a very worthy argument in what has so far been a very good Stage 3 process.