Diolch, Llywydd. We took evidence from the First Minister about the Welsh Government's legislative consent memorandum on the European Union withdrawal agreement Bill at our meeting on 13 January 2020 and we reported last Friday, 17 January. Our report, with the unanimous agreement of the members of the committee, drew five conclusions. The first of these reflected observations we've made on many occasions regarding the fundamental role the Sewel convention plays in the operation of the UK's constitution. We concluded that, if the National Assembly decides not to consent to the Bill on the matters for which consent is required and the UK Parliament nevertheless decides to proceed in the absence of consent, this will have significant adverse constitutional consequences for the future of the Sewel convention and devolution.

Since then, we have seen the letter from UK Government's Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, Stephen Barclay, indicating that, in the absence of consent from this Parliament, the UK Government will nevertheless proceed. This will be the first time that this has happened, and as stated by the Supreme Court in the article 50 Miller judgment, Sewel is a political convention and there are political consequences when conventions are broken. There clearly will be severe and adverse consequences to the already fragile constitutional structure of the UK.

We noted that the First Minister had sought amendments to the Bill in the House of Lords, which were intended to protect the interests of Wales. We concluded that these amendments did not undermine the primary objective of the Bill, which is to leave the European Union on 31 January 2020, but rather, sought to improve parts of the Bill in important areas. Now, as the First Minister has indicated, clause 21 of the Bill would permit the modification of the Government of Wales Act 2006 by UK Government regulations insofar as the UK Government considered such modification appropriate to implement the protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. While such regulations would require approval of both Houses of Parliament, there is no formal role for the National Assembly set out in the Bill, and this is a concern because we do not know the extent to which the 2006 Act might be modified. 

We noted that one of the Welsh Government's amendments sought to address its concern about the breadth of power contained in clause 21. We also drew attention to the concerns of the House of Lords' delegated powers and regulatory reform and constitution committees about the breadth of the powers in clause 21. 

Our third conclusion, agreed with both House of Lords committees, that if clause 21 and its current format can be justified, the powers within it should be limited. Our fourth conclusion repeated our longstanding view that any modification of Schedule 7A or 7B to the Government of Wales Act, in relation to the legislative competence of the National Assembly, should be achieved via the process set out in section 109 of the Act. 

Our final conclusion expressed concern at the inclusion of clause 38 in the Bill—the parliamentary sovereignty clause. We consider it to be an unnecessary provision in a Bill that is primarily concerned with leaving the EU, rather than the broader constitutional framework of the UK. There are important debates to be had about the nature of sovereignty within the UK, but entrenching this provision in statute, and, in particular, in a Bill that is not concerned with the UK's make-up, or the devolution settlements, could well bring about unintended constitutional consequences. 

Llywydd, in the light of the recent developments in the letter from the UK Government, in my capacity as Chair of the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, I'd make these additional comments. The parliamentary process of this Bill is not yet concluded. It is right and proper that the concerns of this Parliament are reflected in this process, and, of course, the Bill has now been amended by the House of Lords, and its final format is not yet determined. The obligation is on the UK Government to seek and to establish consensus. Proceeding without consent would, in my view, spell the end of Sewell. The longer term constitutional consequences of this are not yet certain. I would also wish to make a personal point, and that is this: failure to achieve consensus and overriding Sewell, in the absence of any other constitutional reform, brings the process of disintegration and break-up of the UK one step nearer.