We move on to the next item on our agenda, which is a statement by the Counsel General on article 50 intervention. I call on the Counsel General to introduce his statement.

Thank you. As Members will be aware, the High Court handed down judgment in the matter of Miller, last week. And, as I said in my written statement on Friday, I consider that this case raises issues of profound importance, not only in relation to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, but also in relation to the wider constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom and the legal framework for devolution. It is for those reasons that I propose to apply to intervene in any appeal before the Supreme Court.

Llywydd, I think it is of paramount importance to emphasise at this point that, despite the political furore surrounding it and the frankly alarming tone of much of the press coverage, as the High Court itself said, this case involves a pure question of law. It is not concerned with the merits and the demerits of leaving the European Union, and the politics surrounding that.

Either through a lack of understanding of the UK constitution, or for other reasons, the judgment of the High Court has been misrepresented by some. In addition, there are those who have deliberately chosen to misrepresent the facts to challenge the independence of the judiciary—one of the cornerstones of our democratic parliamentary system. The reporting of the judgment in some newspapers was, frankly, a disgrace and an insult to the good name of journalism.

The democratic structure of the UK and, indeed, this Assembly, is built on a foundation of the rule of law and independence of our judicial system. The tragic recent history of Europe is littered with examples of countries that overthrew the rule of law and undermined the independence of the courts. That road is not a democratic one and it leads only in one direction, and I would hope those who may have made comments and statements in haste will want to reflect.

The sole legal question at issue is whether the United Kingdom Government can, as a matter of constitutional law, use the prerogative powers to give notice of withdrawal from the European Union. In seeking to intervene in any appeal, the Welsh Government will seek to reinforce the importance of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law—core, established principles of British constitutional law. On parliamentary sovereignty, the judgment quotes from the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill that,

‘The bedrock of the British constitution is…the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament.’

On the rule of law, the court confirms that the subordination of the Crown, that is, the Executive Government, to law is the foundation of the rule of law in the United Kingdom. So, put simply, this case, in finding that the prerogative cannot be used in the absence of a clear authority to change the law enacted by Parliament, is about the essence of our representative democracy. As the court said,

‘The United Kingdom is a constitutional democracy framed by legal rules and subject to the rule of law. The courts have a constitutional duty fundamental to the rule of law in a democratic state to enforce rules of constitutional law in the same way as the courts enforce other laws.’

Having outlined what the case is about, I should also make a comment on what it is not about. The First Minister has made crystal clear, and I repeat that sentiment now, that the Welsh Government respects the result of the referendum and this is absolutely not about overturning that decision.

Whilst the case has, to date, focused on the impact of triggering article 50 on individual rights, the proposed use by the UK Government of the prerogative in this manner is relevant to the legal and constitutional relationship of this Assembly to Parliament. The High Court judgment refers to the European Communities Act 1972 as a ‘statute of major constitutional importance’ and as a result found that it should be

‘exempt from casual implied repeal by Parliament’ or its legal effects removed through the use of prerogative powers. It is beyond doubt that the Government of Wales Act 2006 is also a constitutional statute. The use of Executive powers should not be used to override its provisions unless there is a clear and express statutory basis to do so. The use of the prerogative is not, in my view, a lawful basis either to firstly bring about changes to the competence of this Assembly where compatibility with the European treaties and the law created by them is currently a test of legislative competence, or secondly to bring about changes to the powers of the Welsh Ministers that cannot be exercised in a way incompatible with European Union law. Notification of withdrawal from the treaties on the basis of the case put by the Secretary of State will inevitably therefore bring about changes to the competence of the Assembly and the powers of the Welsh Ministers.

Llywydd, the link between the historical principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the Assembly as a modern, devolved legislature is equally clear. As Parliament has enacted the scheme of devolution in Wales, it should be for Parliament and not the Executive to oversee any changes and to do so with the assent of this elected Assembly. The wider constitutional relationships that have been established and continue to develop should not be bypassed. Indeed, one of the challenges posed by the UK leaving the EU will be to develop more effective relationships between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s rights and responsibilities.

The Llywydd took the Chair.

Finally, the proposed action of the United Kingdom Government is relevant to the legal and constitutional relationships of the Welsh Government to the UK Government. Any process should respect and build upon inter-governmental relations. That is why I have taken the decision as Counsel General to seek to intervene in any proposed appeal.

Counsel General, you’ve outlined in your statement what the court case is about and clearly an independent judiciary is vital to our constitution and to our freedoms. However, the UK Government does also have a right to disagree with the court’s decision and that is why they’re appealing the High Court’s ruling where the process of law must be followed. As they state, the UK

‘voted to leave the European Union in a referendum approved by Act of Parliament. And the government is determined to respect the result of the referendum.’

Clearly, it will now be for the Supreme Court to determine which of the two arguments it considers should take primacy. It’s not for me now to suggest otherwise. But I hope you’ll agree that constitutionally it has always been the first duty of a Prime Minister of a Government to safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of the UK where the people entrust sovereignty—being the authority of the state to govern itself without any interference from outside sources or bodies—to a Prime Minister and Government and expect them to hand it on intact to their successors unless the people consent otherwise. Given that and given, as we heard in the External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee from witnesses yesterday, that technically parliamentary sovereignty hasn’t applied since the European Communities Act in 1972 and can only be restored by withdrawal from the European Union, is the UK Government not correct to state it is its duty not to question or quibble or backslide on what they’ve been instructed to do, but they have to get on with the job of leaving the EU? As they say, they want to give UK companies the maximum freedom to trade and operate in the single market and let European businesses do the same here, but they’re not leaving the European Union only to give up control of borders or return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.

The great repeal Bill, which I think is at the essence of the actions you now propose, seeks to end the European Union’s legal supremacy in the UK by converting all EU requirements to British law as soon as Britain, or, should I say, the UK, exits the block. It will pass through Parliament at the same time as negotiations with Brussels and will activate the end of the authority of the European Communities Act 1972 in the UK on day one of EU exit. Critically, the process will be separate from article 50 negotiations, which will activate the formal mechanism to leave the EU.

Given that your written statement to Members last Friday, when you first announced your intention to make an application to be granted permission to intervene in the proposed appeal before the Supreme Court, listed the reasons you gave for that, based on the judgments by the High Court and the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, and that the matters you raise will be subject to bilateral or quadrilateral negotiation between the Welsh and UK Government or the four UK home nations, and not article 50 negotiations, does that not invalidate your involvement in a legal case that applies to whether or not the UK Government can invoke article 50 negotiations, a separate matter, without having parliamentary approval?

The existing convention between the Welsh and UK Government is detailed in ‘Devolution Guidance Note 9: Parliamentary and Assembly Primary Legislation Affecting Wales’. It says:

‘The UK Government would not normally bring forward or support proposals to legislate in relation to Wales on subjects in which the Assembly has legislative competence without the Assembly’s consent. If the UK Government agrees to include provisions which are within the Assembly’s legislative competence in a parliamentary Bill, Welsh Ministers will need to gain the consent of the Assembly via a Legislative Consent Motion.’

How, therefore, do you respond to the statement to the external affairs committee yesterday by Professor Michael Keating that, in evidence to a committee in Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland said the great repeal Bill would not be an opportunity to roll back on devolved powers? Professor Keating expressed his view that the UK Government were very unlikely to do this.

Yesterday, in the same committee, the First Minister expressed his view that the free movement of people, having to make financial contributions to the EU, and being subject to judgments of the European Court of Justice, were secondary to full and unfettered access to the single market.

How, therefore, do you respond to the evidence given yesterday by Professor Roger Scully to committee that, for many people who voted ‘leave’ in Wales, their priority is to prevent free movement of people or to control EU migration, and, he added, something politicians must be aware of?

Finally, in respect of the First Minister’s evidence to committee yesterday, he stated that, if the great repeal Bill encroaches on devolved Assembly powers, there would need to be a legislative consent motion. Would you agree that that means that, if the great repeal Bill does not encroach on devolved Assembly powers, there would not need to be a legislative consent motion and that, therefore, might question the justification for your intervention on this matter?

Thank you for that large number of very complex and very detailed questions. I hope you wrote them all yourself. They do raise a whole series of important points, though.

The first one, with regard to the sovereignty of Parliament—that is exactly what this case is about. The sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law is important not just to the United Kingdom Parliament, but also to the devolved Assemblies. That is why Northern Ireland is actually going to be involved in this case and is why Scotland has announced that they will be intervening in this case, and I’m glad that we’ll have the support of Scotland to the decision that’s already been taken within Wales to intervene in this particular case, because it is fundamental that the devolved Governments do have a voice, a clear voice, within an enormous process that is going to have significant constitutional change.

Let’s deal with the issue of the great repeal Bill to start with. We’ll obviously review that when we actually know what is in the repeal Bill; I have no knowledge whatsoever. But, taking on board the point you made about legislative consent motions, of course, if the great repeal Bill does encroach on areas that relate to the devolved settlement for Wales then, obviously, that will require the assent of the Assembly and, obviously, the lodging of a legislative consent motion.

If it does not encroach on anything that is to do with devolved responsibilities, there may be other constitutional relationships and impacts that are of concern. It is just that it is impossible to say, until I actually know what is in the content of any great repeal Bill, what its structure is, what its objectives are, and what the timescale is. So, it certainly does not invalidate involvement, and, in fact, I think I would be failing in my duty if, as the law officer for Wales, with one of the prime responsibilities for the rule of law—if there was not a clear Welsh voice in the Supreme Court when all these matters of major constitutional importance are considered. And let’s be honest about this—this is probably the most important constitutional case since the trial and execution of Charles I.

With regard to the views of Michael Keating and Professor Scully with regard to the issue of the free movement of people, the issues around the nature of any Brexit or the consequence of triggering article 50 were not a matter before the court, and will not be a matter in the Supreme Court itself. This is solely about the process and who actually has the authority. I would also draw the Member’s attention to the fact that the curtailing of the royal prerogative over the past 300 years has been one of the most important constitutional developments in the development of the United Kingdom’s constitutional position, establishing the sovereignty of Parliament and ensuring that there is an Executive that is accountable to an elected representative Parliament.

I thank the Counsel General for his statement this afternoon, and for his intervention in this significant issue. I’d also like to associate Plaid Cymru with the sentiments he’s expressed regarding the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.

That there is and will be far-reaching consequences of this judgment and the final determination of the Supreme Court is beyond doubt, and it is clear that a consequence of the triggering of article 50, however that occurs, will bring about changes to the competence of the National Assembly and Welsh Ministers. The provisions of the European Communities Act 1972 are enshrined in the Welsh constitution, and must not be interfered with or amended without the expressed will of this country and its democratically-elected legislature. I would be grateful to the Counsel General if he could elaborate further on the exact nature of this proposed intervention in the appeal to the Supreme Court, specifically on what formal role he is seeking for either Welsh Government or the National Assembly in the process of triggering article 50. Given his proposed intervention, is it his view that, if upheld, the High Court ruling calls for primary legislation at the UK Parliament on triggering article 50, or, as some have suggested, that a resolution of Parliament would satisfy the demands of the High Court ruling?

Secondly, would he agree that there are potential dangers in upholding the principle of UK parliamentary sovereignty above all other considerations, as far as Wales is concerned? For example, if triggering article 50 occurs through primary legislation at the UK Parliament, then the UK Government will be able to supplant such legislation with secondary legislation that may infringe upon devolved matters, but will not be privy or be required to legislative consent motions of this Assembly or other devolved Parliaments. Is the Counsel General concerned that the principle that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Assembly might be abandoned as the UK Government hides behind the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and may argue that these are not normal circumstances?

Finally, Llywydd, article 9 of the Bill of Rights Act 1689 establishes that Acts of Parliament must be accepted entirely by the courts. This would make it impossible for Welsh Government to retrospectively challenge any infringement on devolution as a consequence of UK parliamentary legislation. That, of course, does not apply to Bills of the National Assembly, as we discovered in the previous Assembly term, when a Bill was challenged by the UK Government in the Supreme Court. What avenues, therefore, is the Counsel General considering constitutionally and politically in order not simply to uphold the principle of so-called parliamentary sovereignty, but the sovereignty of the people of Wales?

Again, thank you very much for those thoughtful questions, some of which I will be able to comment on to some degree, but not able to give you a full answer on, because there are many unknowns. The nature of the intervention is really as I have set out. On what will be my intentions in the intervention, it will be to make representations about the role of Parliament in determining any changes to the devolution settlement, it’ll be the specific implications of the UK Government’s proposed use of prerogative powers to bring about changes to constitutional arrangements, and it’ll be in relation to the engagement of the devolved institutions to ensure that the interests of Wales are fully taken into account. Those are the underlying principles of the intervention.

Now, as this is a matter of ongoing litigation, my proposed detailed arguments are being developed on a comprehensive evaluation of the court judgment. I’m limited in what I’m able to say concerning the full details of the proposed involvement, and, if my application to intervene is agreed, further details of the case will be made available in due course. As part of the process, it will be necessary to file our own details of the case, of the issues that we intend to raise within the Supreme Court that we are concerned about that relate to the judgment or to any other matters that the Supreme Court may raise during the course of the hearing. So, it will be very much an ongoing process, but we are setting out the principles, which are, essentially, that there is a constitutional settlement within the United Kingdom, that the impact of triggering article 50 does have a significant impact on that, that it is the role of Parliament to trigger by means of the exercise of its legislative powers. There is an issue, as you raise, indeed, as to whether this could be done by a formal vote of Parliament or whether it would actually need to be legislation. That, of course, is one of the issues that will be put to the Supreme Court in order for guidance, depending upon what the outcome of its actual judgment is. There are constitutional experts who’ve expressed a variety of views on that. And, of course, there is always the potential that the Supreme Court will overturn the High Court judgment. That having been said, as I have outlined the constitutional legal position, I am confident that that is a solid position that certainly gives a very solid basis for us to actually be present and to intervene.

With regard to the issues of Sewel—well, of course, Sewel is a non-justiciable convention. But, as with all constitutional law, in an environment where we do not have a written constitution, it is more than just a custom or an agreement—it has a constitutional status. The position that’s been outlined by the First Minister is very much one that, where there are going to be impacts on the devolution settlement, then that is a matter that should come before this Assembly. I think the First Minister’s also made it very clear how the Prime Minister’s position will be considerably strengthened by having the assent and the support of the devolved Governments.

With regard to—I think it was the article 9 point; it’s really with regard to the role of the court and with regard to legislation per se. As has been made very clear within the judgment itself, the role of the court is to interpret the law. The law, if passed by Parliament, is sovereign. The courts cannot overturn that law—they have no role within that whatsoever—but what the courts do have is the responsibility, the duty, and the role of interpreting the law, and that is exactly what is happening at the moment in the moves towards the Supreme Court.

Will Counsel General agree with me that it’s perfectly lawful to challenge the independence of judges? Indeed, the Bill of Rights of 1688 specifically provides for this because a judge may be removed from office upon resolution of both Houses of Parliament. In the Supreme Court case involving General Pinochet, on whether he had immunity from prosecution as a former head of state in Chile, Lord Hoffmann was held to have disabled himself from hearing the case and the decision was overturned on grounds of his potential partiality. So, there’s nothing whatever wrong in politicians expressing views either on the judgments to which judges arrive, or indeed, their competence or other interest in doing so. Having said that—

There is in this place and we are governed by the Standing Order, as I noted this morning.

I’m merely talking in terms of constitutional principle and I’m not expressing a view on any individual judge. For myself, if I may say, I don’t personally have any problem with this judgement in the High Court. It seems to me that there shouldn’t be any difficulty in Parliament providing a means for a vote on the issue if that is what is required, and it’ll be interesting to know if Labour, Plaid Cymru and the other parties will give effect to the will of the people, as expressed in a referendum, in such a vote. Because although this case has been on the question of the royal prerogative and the extent to which that may be used to begin the process of effecting our withdrawal from the European Union, what we’re actually talking about here is the people’s prerogative, as expressed in a vote in the referendum, which was on the simple question of should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave the EU—no ifs or buts and no qualifications about whether we have a successor agreement with the EU or remain in the single market, or whatever. The people have decided this issue and Parliament is under a moral duty to respect their wishes. I’d be grateful to know if the Counsel General accepts that.

I note from the judgment that, although the Counsel General was represented in the High Court proceedings, the counsel, on his behalf, didn’t actually didn’t play any part in the proceedings. Is it his intention, in the Supreme Court, that he should be represented not by a mute, but by someone who will play a full part in the proceedings? Therefore, will he be supporting the Government’s view that, in triggering article 50, it’s the people’s prerogative that the Government is giving effect to?

I’m quite surprised by the judgment in some ways, because although it is settled law that the Crown may not, by the use of its prerogative, change the law of the land and the rights and obligations imposed upon or given to private individuals—and that goes back as far as the Case of Proclamations in 1610, and was fully brought up to date in a case in 1916 called the Zamora, which was also referred to in the judgment—the mere fact of giving notice of withdrawal from a treaty does not, in itself, impliedly repeal any legislation. Therefore, in order to give effect to withdrawal, the European Communities Act itself will have to be repealed and therefore that will go through the normal parliamentary processes. And all legislation that hangs upon it that we want to retain, even if only on a temporary basis, therefore, has to be legislated for by means of another positive Bill. So, primary legislation is the inevitable by-product of this trigger of article 50, and therefore parliamentary propriety is to be respected and will be respected throughout the whole process.

So, I’d be interested to know if the Counsel General agrees with me on that point and that, therefore, the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament, as he referred to, in the words of Lord Bingham, will not only be respected but facilitated, because, as it is at the minute—this is the last point that I want to make—as a result of our membership of the European Union, we have created a new legal order in Europe, which is actually superior to the Crown in Parliament. Therefore, the whole of this process, which we’re now beginning to engage in, is to restore the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament, and ultimately, the power of the British people to determine who they are going to be governed by.

Thank you for those questions and suggestions, some of which, I have to say, were contradictory—and some were confusing. But, just dealing initially with the issue of the independence of the judiciary—which, I’m glad to say, I think the Member was saying he does support—it is a good idea, since the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, for example, states very clearly that

‘the Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary’.

That is the statutory position. So, you will not be surprised—and I hope the Member will then disassociate himself from the comments that were made by his acting leader, Nigel Farage, who said that they would be leading a march of 100,000 people to the Supreme Court and people were so angry that there might well be violence arising as a consequence. That, all I can see, is an attempt to intimidate an independent judiciary. I hope he will disassociate himself from any such suggestion, and also disassociate himself from the statement that was made by the UKIP leadership contender Suzanne Evans, who suggested judges should face the prospect of being sacked by MPs in the wake of the article 50 case. She warned about judges intervening and the conflicts of interest and, basically, made it very clear that, unless judges agree with UKIP, they would want to see mechanisms for them to be actually sacked.

It seems to me to be a complete contradiction that what actually happened during the referendum, which was partly about the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament—but it appears to be the sovereignty of Parliament and the independence of the judiciary, so long as you actually agree with us, otherwise, it can actually be bypassed. I hope you will make very clear in statements you subsequently make that you actually disassociate yourself from those inflammatory comments that have been made.

The judgment will not be—whatever decision the Supreme Court comes to—it will not be anything to do with the European referendum debate, the merits or demerits otherwise. I’ve said that very clearly in the oral statement I’ve made. It was made very clear in the judge. This is about what is the legal, democratic, constitutional mechanism for actually triggering article 50, the consequence of which—as a consequence of the statement by the UK Government that triggering article 50 is an irreversible process—means that, at the end of that process, statutory legislation would actually become defunct. It was around the issue of what the mechanism to supplant primary legislation that Parliament has actually created and how can that be done—can it be done by an executive or can it be done by Parliament itself? The Supreme Court has accepted the arguments that were made that this can only be done by Parliament itself because of the constitutional principles that have been established over 300 years that are actually about the protection of the will of the people and preventing usurpation of our democratic institutions.

I thank the Counsel General for his statement, which, if I may say, is a very welcome statement of fact and good judgment in the debate, over the last few days, outside this Chamber, that has, too often, lacked very much of either. Today of all days, you might recall that the second President of the United States, John Adams, described Great Britain as a nation of laws to which the Crown is subject. In any other circumstances, the notion that rights conferred by Parliament could disappear at the stroke of the Prime Minister’s pen would, rightly, be an outrage, and this is no different.

I’ve understood his comments today, in the statement and on responses, to suggest that there are circumstances, in his view, where the parliamentary trigger of article 50 could lead to a legislative consent motion in this Assembly. I wonder if he could confirm that. Secondly, will he tell us whether, in his judgment, the Lord Chancellor has complied with her statutory obligations, which he’s read out in the Chamber, which are so fundamental to the proper administration of justice—to defend the independence of the judiciary? Because, in my opinion, she’s shamefully failed to do that.

Thank you for those questions. The nature of the laws to which the Crown is subject is the very essence, I think, of what has emerged from my statement and emerged from the judgment of the High Court, and is going to be the prime matter that is going to be considered by the Supreme Court. If we really want to put this in a historical perspective, it is a principle that has led to two monarchs being removed; it is a principle that led to a civil war, a glorious revolution, a bill of rights enshrined in legislation during the period of the first world war, but was also a fundamental issue where this country stood against the abuse of the rule of law and the abuse of the independence of the judiciary during the second world war. So, there is a constitutional structure—a democratic purpose—to all of this. I would say that those who attack those thought-out constitutional principles do so at the peril of the democracy of the United Kingdom and of the devolved governments.

While the Counsel General is listing the historical precedent, let’s go back to the Magna Carta, which said that the laws of Wales should be applied in the lands of Wales. Let us recall that, therefore, the triggering of article 50 will have a very real impact on the domestic law of Wales. Therefore, I fully support his decision to apply to be part of the case in the Supreme Court. I think he’s done the correct step for the people of Wales, and for this Assembly as well, as a Parliament in Wales. And can I say how great it is that he’s done it before Scotland has? Because, usually, it turns out we do it after Scotland, but this time he was leading the way. Can he just confirm his reading, which I think is in his statement, and my interpretation of what the High Court had to say very clearly—that it was because this has an effect on domestic law that this should be a decision taken by Parliament? I would have thought that anyone who has been a Member of Parliament would want to defend that to the hilt, whether they are a Member of this Parliament or the Westminster Parliament now. It’s a very clearly worded decision, and it could be potentially done by a motion before Parliament rather than a Bill. I’m slightly surprised at Westminster’s rush to say this must be a Bill. Can he confirm that a motion, in his view, because he has to put in a detailed argument as part of this case now—will he be arguing that this could be done by a motion as well? Because I think it is very important that the MPs who called the referendum as a non-binding advisory referendum take cognisance of that and interpret the referendum in the best political way, but I don’t regard a Westminster referendum as binding on myself as an Assembly Member. So, I think we have to defend what’s best for Wales in this process. Certainly, what’s best for Wales is that, before article 50 is triggered, there’s proper parliamentary scrutiny of what the likely outcome of that triggering will be, and what its impact will be on our domestic legislation.

Can he just say a little more about the defence of the judiciary? He read out from the 2005 Act just shortly, which said that the Lord Chief Justice and officers and so forth were defenders. It was a bit difficult for the Lord Chief Justice to defend the judiciary on this occasion, as the Lord Chief Justice was one of the three judges that actually came to the decision—and a very good decision by a good Welshman as well. So, I think it is very important that we hear more from Westminster. Is he having discussions with people like Liz Truss, who should be saying a lot more about the independence of the judiciary? She should be explaining to people. Maybe there’s an educational aspect here. People need to understand why we have a separation of powers and why it is that the judiciary acts in this way to uphold the rule of law, because without it we will have the situation that we’re getting now today in America with people like Donald Trump saying that Mexican judges should be thrown out of office because they make judgments against his own political and commercial interests. That’s the kind of thing that we want to protect against, and that’s why it’s so important to have the independence of the judiciary upheld.

Finally, can he just say a little bit—because I think it’s important that we ask him this question—what the likely cost of this will be in being party to this decision, which I support? I think we need to know what the cost is, and what the likely implications are for that. Who is he likely to use in terms of engaging with an eminent QC in order to take this case forward?

Okay. If I deal first of all with the legislative consent motion point, again, which I think the Member Jeremy Miles has raised as well. I recall now I didn’t actually answer that specifically. I think it depends very much what is in the great repeal Bill. We won’t know that until there is much more substance to that. There’s a broad range of additional issues, and that, of course, relates to once article 50 has been triggered, and that is the issue of the repatriation of powers and how those may be impacted as well. So, the Supreme Court won’t be dealing with those specific points. It will be dealing with the point of principle, and that is: what is the appropriate constitutional mechanism for triggering article 50. You make the point, also, in terms of the role of the Lord Chief Justice in protecting the independence of the judiciary. Of course, as you say, he was one of the three judges. But of course, section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, makes it very, very clear that the Lord Chancellor and the Ministers of the Crown, and a whole range of others who are associated with, and involved with, the judiciary and the administration of justice, have that as a responsibility. What the Act is doing is establishing a legal pre-eminence of the independence of the judiciary. I think it is going to be predominantly a matter for Parliament, I think, to actually raise issues with regard to the points raised with regard to the Lord Chancellor’s role. I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to comment further, but I have read out the section, and I have made additional comments about what I think is important about the independence of the judiciary.

In terms of what the cost will be, we will be able to provide that information in due course. I don’t have that information and, of course, it depends on a number of factors in terms of the amount of work, the number of conferences between now and the fifth, the actual length of trial, and whether there are any cost orders at the end of that particular process.

In terms of representation, I will provide in a further statement details of that. Obviously, we will arrange for expert representation in court, and that will be direct intervention and the submission of papers that outline what our specific areas of interest are in the intervention. I will make a further statement to this Assembly. I think that probably covers all the questions that have been raised so far.

I welcome this statement by the Counsel General, and also his stated intention to intervene at the Supreme Court. But, before I turn to some matters of detail, it’s been an interesting week, and there have been undoubtedly some attempts to cast aspersions on the integrity of this High Court decision and on the independence of the judiciary. I’m a fan of social media, and I don’t think anybody could have summed it up better for me than a former captain of the 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, who served in Afghanistan and who also happens to be a serving Conservative Member of Parliament, who tweeted:

‘I spent half my life in countries where the judiciary do what politicians tell them to. You wouldn't want to live there. Grow up.’

But if I could turn to the issues of substance here, it is very welcome, on the timeliness and clarity of the statement, to see his explanation that the use of the prerogative in the Counsel General’s view is strictly limited in terms of what it can effect on changes to the competence of this Assembly, and also about changes to the powers of Welsh Ministers. That clarification is very good to see. One area that I would appreciate some further clarification on is both the process and the means by which the assent of this Assembly is sought. The Counsel General has been quite clear that it should be for Parliament, and not the Executive, to oversee any changes, and to do so with the assent of this elected Assembly. Can he, at this stage—appreciating that we have to wait for the decision of the Supreme Court—cast any further light on that process of gaining assent, and the means by which we in this Assembly would give that assent as well?

I will do my best to at least set some parameters in an environment where we don’t quite know what all the parts of the jigsaw are, so we won’t see the complete picture for some time yet. But you raise issues about what the legal consequences are of withdrawal and the role of legislative consent. The legislative competence of the Assembly and the powers of the Welsh Ministers are both currently directly linked to the continuing application of the European treaties. When the United Kingdom withdraws from the European Union, it may be that the Government of Wales Act 2006, our framework for devolution, will need to be amended. The established constitutional arrangements for legislative consent motions will apply in relation to any legislation by Parliament to amend the Act. The Welsh Government would expect to be consulted on any such amendment, and the role of the Assembly will be carefully considered. The constitutional arrangements concerning legislative consent motions do not refer to the prerogative because it was something that just could not have been contemplated—that it would be used in this manner. As Parliament has enacted the scheme of devolution in Wales, it should be for Parliament, and not the executive, to oversee any changes, and to do so with the assent of this elected Assembly.

In a way that was unexpected to all of us, I would have thought, this Assembly has come of age, constitutionally, legally, and in all other ways, on this question facing us today. I believe that it’s very significant that the Welsh Counsel General here today has spoken more clearly than I heard any official of the UK Government speaking on this particular issue in Westminster yesterday. I am proud of that, because it does demonstrate that we have not only the individual intellect, but also the constitutional robustness to stand up for ourselves. I do think that these questions that the Counsel General has placed before us in the written statement on Friday and also today are very acceptable issues that we will have to follow to support him through this process. So, I do welcome the fact that he is participating in the process and agree entirely with his analysis of the questions before us.

But what I would like to ask specifically is one further question: what would the possibility be of this Assembly taking powers contained within European legislation, which would continue to be in force here, if the UK Parliament were to try to repeal them? That is, would be the possibilities for Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland to create continuity in terms of European legislation and its impact on citizens, within those devolved areas, in the situation we currently find ourselves in? I don’t expect him to answer that question today, but I would ask him to ponder it.

Can I thank the Member again for his thoughtful comments, because these are deep and fundamentally important issues for our constitutional settlement and for the constitutional arrangements for the UK for the future? He’s correct that I can’t give a full answer to that. There is actually a very interesting publication that came out recently, ‘Brexit and Beyond’, where I noticed this comment:

‘Brexit will have a big impact on devolution. It may lead to a recentralisation as the UK reconstitutes itself as a sovereign polity; or to further decentralisation with the devolution of EU competences. In either case, the process will be difficult and controversial.’

Of course, there are those issues, once we go down this process, which I think inevitably we will do, then these are these issues that will come about, and in my view this is exactly the whole point as to why this is a matter for Parliament in terms of the legislation, but then the scrutiny of that legislative and those constitutional processes.

I thank the Counsel General.