Item 6 on our agenda this afternoon is a statement by the First Minister on the update on the Brexit negotiations, and I call on the First Minister to make the statement—Carwyn Jones.

Thank you, Deputy Presiding Officer. I’d like to make a statement on recent developments with regard to the UK’s decision to leave the European Union.

The Llywydd took the Chair.

Yn fy natganiad ysgrifenedig yn gynharach heddiw, soniais am gyfarfodydd diweddar â Llywodraeth y DU, gan gynnwys y Cyd-bwyllgor Gweinidogion (Negodiadau’r UE) yr wythnos ddiwethaf, lle’r oedd Ysgrifennydd y Cabinet dros Gyllid a Llywodraeth Leol yn bresennol. O hynny, bydd yr Aelodau wedi gweld bod rhyw awgrym o’r diwedd bod Llywodraeth y DU yn sylweddoli bod angen iddynt weithio'n llawer agosach gyda'r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig ar y materion hanfodol hyn. Cawsom sicrwydd y byddem yn cael ein cynnwys yn llawnach yn natblygiad safbwyntiau polisi yn y dyfodol pan fydd y trafodaethau'n symud i ail gam trafodaethau manwl am ein perthynas â'r UE yn y dyfodol.

Fodd bynnag, mae'n rhaid imi ddweud, Llywydd, na fyddai hyn yn anodd, o ystyried y ffordd y cyhoeddwyd papurau ar faterion hanfodol fel trefniadau tollau, ffin Iwerddon-Gogledd Iwerddon, a hyd yn oed bolisïau datganoledig ymchwil a datblygu heb ddim mewnbwn gan Lywodraeth Cymru. At hynny, o ran goblygiadau cyfansoddiadol Brexit o fewn y DU a'r mater hollbwysig o ddarparu sicrwydd cyfreithiol wrth inni adael yr UE, mae’n ymddangos ein bod wedi gweld newid sylweddol yn safbwynt Llywodraeth y DU. Yn unol â'r syniadau a nodwyd gennym ym mis Gorffennaf, rydym wedi cytuno â Llywodraethau’r Alban a'r DU ar yr egwyddorion a ddylai fod yn sail i fframweithiau cyffredin y gellid eu datblygu ar y cyd rhwng gweinyddiaethau ar gyfer meysydd lle mae angen cydweithrediad neu safonau cyffredin pan nad yw fframweithiau'r UE ar waith mwyach. Rwyf wedi cyhoeddi'r egwyddorion hyn i’r Aelodau mewn datganiad ysgrifenedig. Mae gwaith i ddatblygu hyn ar y gweill nawr ac rwy’n edrych ymlaen at weld y Cynulliad hwn yn cael cyfle i graffu ar drefniadau ar y cyd yn y dyfodol.

Er ei bod hi'n llawer rhy gynnar i ddod i'r casgliad y bydd Llywodraeth y DU yn tawelu ein pryderon sylfaenol am y Bil tynnu'n ôl o’r Undeb Ewropeaidd, mae'n amlwg eu bod o leiaf yn cydnabod difrifoldeb y materion a godwyd gennym ac ehangder y gefnogaeth yn Senedd y DU i’r gwelliannau yr ydym ni, ynghyd â Llywodraeth yr Alban, wedi eu cynnig. Fel Llywodraeth, rydym yn gwbl glir na fyddwn yn argymell bod y Cynulliad hwn yn rhoi eu caniatâd i'r ddeddfwriaeth oni bai a hyd nes y bydd diwygiadau ystyrlon mewn dau faes: yn gyntaf i ddileu’r cyfyngiadau newydd a osodwyd ar gymhwysedd deddfwriaethol y Cynulliad; ac, yn ail, i sicrhau bod rhaid i Weinidogion y DU ymgynghori â ni cyn gwneud unrhyw newidiadau i ddeddfwriaeth o fewn cymhwysedd datganoledig, pa mor dechnegol bynnag a fydd. Dyna'r lleiaf un sydd ei angen. Defnyddio'r pwerau hynny yn gydamserol yw'r canlyniad a fyddai orau gennym ni. I ddefnyddio ymadrodd braidd yn ystrydebol, mae'r bêl yn awr yn eu cwrt nhw.

Os ydym wedi gweld rhai datblygiadau cadarnhaol o ran yr agenda ddomestig, nid wyf yn gweld cymaint o le i fod yn optimistaidd ynglŷn â’r trafodaethau â’r UE-27. Yr wythnos diwethaf, cyfarfu'r Cyngor Ewropeaidd i ystyried a oedd cynnydd digonol wedi'i wneud i symud ymlaen i ail gam y trafodaethau. Yn anffodus, daethant i'r casgliad bod angen mwy o waith o hyd ar delerau’r DU i ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd cyn y gall trafodaethau ddechrau am y berthynas hirdymor a’r cwestiwn hanfodol am drefniadau trosiannol. Ym marn ein partneriaid yn yr UE, nid yw Llywodraeth y DU wedi rhoi digon o eglurder ynghylch sut i amddiffyn hawliau dinasyddion yr UE yn y DU na sut i ddatrys y problemau cymhleth a achosir gan ffin dir Gogledd Iwerddon, nac ynghylch y telerau ariannol ar gyfer ymadawiad y DU. Mae hynny'n bryder mawr ac mae'n fethiant o ran polisi ac arweiniad gwleidyddol.

Beth fydden ni wedi'i ddweud pe baem wedi cael gwybod ar 30 Mehefin y llynedd, 16 mis yn ddiweddarach, a lai na 18 mis cyn inni adael yr UE yn ddiofyn hyd yn oed os na cheir cytundeb, na fydden ni hyd yn oed wedi dechrau trafod telerau ein perthynas â'r UE yn y dyfodol? Wrth gwrs, roedd sut i ddatrys y cymysgedd cymhleth iawn o gysylltiadau sydd wedi ein rhwymo ni ynghyd â'n cymdogion agosaf ers dros 40 mlynedd wastad yn mynd i fod yn gymhleth iawn. Ond o ran hawliau dinasyddion, rydym wedi dadlau ers diwrnod 1 y gallai, ac y dylai, Llywodraeth y DU fod wedi gwneud cynnig hael ac unochrog i sicrhau hawliau presennol yr holl ddinasyddion o’r UE sydd wedi dewis byw a gweithio yn y DU ar gyfer y dyfodol. Nid yw'n rhy hwyr i wneud hynny nawr. Nid mater moesol yn unig yw hwn—mae dinasyddion yr UE yng Nghymru yn gwneud cyfraniad gwerthfawr i'n busnesau, ein gwasanaethau cyhoeddus a'n cymdeithas, ac ni allwn fforddio eu colli. Byddai wedi bod yn symudiad y byddai'r UE, rwy’n credu, wedi gorfod gweithredu yn yr un modd.

O ran ffin Iwerddon-Gogledd Iwerddon, mae wedi dod yn gynyddol glir na ellir cynnal ffin feddal, fel y’i gelwir, oni bai ein bod yn parhau i weithio o fewn undeb tollau gyda'r UE. Ac, eto, dylai'r dewis yma fod yn glir. Nid yw Llywodraeth y DU wedi cyflwyno dim tystiolaeth o gwbl i gyfiawnhau eu tybiaeth y byddai manteision economaidd symud oddi wrth undebau tollau, wedi’u hudo gan y posibilrwydd o gytundebau masnach rydd newydd, yn gwneud iawn am yr anfanteision o godi rhwystrau newydd i lif masnach rydd a dilyffethair i'n marchnad fwyaf.

Ac er ei bod yn amlwg na ddylid rhoi setliad ariannol gwael i drethdalwyr y DU, mae angen inni gydnabod dau beth: yn gyntaf, y byddai'r difrod economaidd a allai ddigwydd os na chaiff bargen ei tharo’n gwneud i unrhyw golled i'r Trysorlys oherwydd taliad untro i gydnabod ein rhwymedigaethau ymddangos yn gwbl bitw; ac, yn ail, bod gennym gyfrifoldebau moesol a gwleidyddol i anrhydeddu ymrwymiadau a wnaethpwyd gyda'n cytundeb fel aelod-wladwriaeth. Os na allwn gyflawni'r cytundebau hynny, pa obaith sydd y bydd pobl yn ymddiried ynom i wneud hynny yn y dyfodol? Gofynnaf i'r Aelodau yma feddwl sut y byddem yn ymateb pe bai’r Comisiwn Ewropeaidd yn rhoi gwybod inni y byddai rhaglenni gweithredol y gronfa strwythurol yng Nghymru, y cytunwyd arnynt â nhw ar ôl blynyddoedd o ddatblygu a thrafod, yn cael eu torri'n sylweddol oherwydd penderfyniad a wnaethpwyd mewn aelod-wladwriaeth arall, heb i weddill yr UE gael cyfle i ddylanwadu arno. Y posibilrwydd o bump neu chwe blynedd arall o arian ar gyfer prentisiaethau, ar gyfer seilwaith hanfodol fel y metro, i gynorthwyo i harneisio potensial ein prifysgolion i gymhwyso ymchwil i economi’r byd go iawn, a ninnau wedi credu ei fod yn ddiogel, sut y byddem yn ymateb pe bai hynny’n cael ei gipio i ffwrdd?

Mae'r methiant i sicrhau cynnydd digonol ar y materion hyn erbyn Cyngor Ewropeaidd mis Hydref yn un allweddol. Er bod Llywodraeth y DU, o’r diwedd, wedi derbyn yr angen, fel yr ydym wedi ei argymell ers y refferendwm, am gyfnod pontio i ddarparu elfen o sicrwydd economaidd, mae busnesau a sefydliadau busnes yn dweud wrthym fod angen iddynt wneud penderfyniadau buddsoddi allweddol nawr. Nid oes amser i’w golli o gwbl. Nid dim ond fi sy’n dweud hyn: gofynnwch i Gydffederasiwn Diwydiant Prydain.

Llywydd, yr wythnos ddiwethaf, ymosododd rhywun arnaf am ddweud bod 'dim bargen' yn annychmygadwy a’i bod yn amhosibl lliniaru effeithiau canlyniad mor drychinebus i'r trafodaethau gyda'r UE-27. Dewch imi ddyfynnu, felly, rhai o'r enghreifftiau o rybuddion sefydliadau arbenigol am effaith 'dim bargen' a gyhoeddwyd yn y mis diwethaf yn unig: mae Cymdeithas Feddygol Prydain yn dweud y byddai,

‘yn dileu'r warant o ddarpariaeth radioisotopau gyson a phrydlon’, sydd

‘yn hanfodol...i drin canser... o bosibl yn arwain at oedi cyn rhoi diagnosis a chanslo llawdriniaeth i gleifion’.

Meddai Cymdeithas Peilotiaid Awyrennau Prydain,

‘Gallai cwmnïau awyrennau yn y DU orfod rhoi'r gorau i hedfan—mae mor ddifrifol â hynny’.

Mae Consortiwm Manwerthu Prydain yn dweud y gallai dychwelyd at dariffau Sefydliad Masnach y Byd olygu bod siopwyr yn y DU yn talu hyd at draean yn fwy am eitemau bwyd bob dydd, gyda phris caws yn cynyddu 30 y cant a thomatos yn cynyddu bron i 20 y cant, ac y byddai cyflwyno rheolaethau tollau heb fawr o rybudd yn creu,

‘tarfu aruthrol ac yn cael effaith bosibl ar y bwyd sydd ar gael ar y silffoedd’.

Mae'r Sefydliad Trafnidiaeth Cludo Nwyddau yn dweud y byddai datrysiad ymyl dibyn, yn anfon siociau costus drwy lifoedd masnach a chadwyni cyflenwi'r UE.

Mae'r Bwrdd Datblygu Amaethyddiaeth a Garddwriaeth yn modelu senario cadarnle’r DU lle rydym yn masnachu ar delerau Sefydliad Masnach y Byd, a fyddai'n golygu bod ffermydd ucheldir yn anghynaladwy yn economaidd. Ac mae prif fanc yr Iseldiroedd, Rabobank, yn amcangyfrif y gallai ‘dim bargen’ arwain at lefel cynnyrch domestig gros sydd 18 y cant yn is yn 2030 nag y byddai pe byddem wedi aros yn yr UE.

Felly, mae'n amlwg i mi y byddai’n cymryd degawdau i wneud iawn am Brexit anhrefnus, ac y byddai hefyd yn arwain at anhrefn a niwed i'n heconomi, ein ffabrig cymdeithasol a'n diogelwch. Felly, sut ydym ni'n atal y canlyniad hwn? Wel, atal y canlyniad hwn, nid paratoi cynlluniau wrth gefn ar ei gyfer, yw’r hyn y dylem fod yn ei wneud, a'r hyn yr ydym yn ei wneud. Byddai gwneud fel arall fel teithiwr ar y Titanic sydd, wrth weld y mynydd iâ yn syth o’i flaen, yn mynd islaw i ddod o hyd i’w siaced achub a phacio ei fagiau, yn hytrach na rhuthro i'r bont a churo ar y drws mewn ymgais daer i rybuddio'r capten am y trychineb sydd o’i flaen—mae angen inni rybuddio pobl am yr hyn sydd o'n blaenau.

Felly, rwy’n ailadrodd yr hyn a ddywedais yr wythnos diwethaf: ni all ‘dim bargen’ fod yn opsiwn. Pa mor anodd bynnag—ac nid wyf yn tanbrisio'r anawsterau—mae'n rhaid i Lywodraeth y DU wneud popeth yn eu pŵer i ffurfio safbwynt am y telerau ymadael, fel y bydd Cyngor Ewropeaidd mis Rhagfyr yn symud trafodaethau i'r ail gam ac yn gyflym iawn wedi hynny yn cyrraedd cytundeb am gyfnod pontio o ddwy flynedd o leiaf. Mae ein cynnig i gefnogi’r trafodaethau a chyfrannu atynt yn dal i sefyll, a, Llywydd, rydym yn parhau i bwyso ar bob cyfle i sicrhau bod buddiannau Cymru yn cael eu hystyried yn iawn.

Notwithstanding the fact that the First Minister has the last word and has a habit of using it, I can’t resist using the statement by Churchill about Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain—that he, I quote:

‘looked at foreign affairs through the wrong end of a municipal drainpipe’.

I can’t also avoid the Churchillian edicts, which went along the lines of,

‘Don’t argue about difficulties. The difficulties will argue for themselves’.

You referred to the Joint Ministerial Committee (European negotiations) on 16 October, attended by the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government. The joint communiqué issued following that meeting concluded that,

‘Ministers noted the positive progress being made on consideration of common frameworks’.

Should we therefore not be celebrating the fact that, as this said, agreement has been reached between the UK Government and devolved administrations on the principles that will underpin the process of bringing back powers from the EU to the UK, and underpin the development of common UK frameworks jointly between the four UK administrations, where co-operation and common standards—your words—are needed when EU frameworks cease to apply in the UK? In that context, also, could you tell us whether there’s been any discussion yet, or whether you’re aware of any discussion yet, regarding proposals for adjudication applying to those agreed common frameworks?

You referred to the European Council meeting last week. Why will you not acknowledge that the two sides—I don’t like using ‘sides’, because, of course, we’re all friends and neighbours—are now within touching distance of a deal on citizens’ rights, that they agree there must be no physical infrastructure on the Irish border and that the common travel area must continue, and that the Prime Minister’s Florence speech has given further impetus to discussions over the financial settlement and implementation period? I will resist asking what policies, apparently somewhat confused, your colleagues in the UK Parliament have on this in terms of the customs union, single market, free movement and second referendum, because I’m as confused as everybody else about that.

Is it not the case that, following last week’s European Council meeting, the European Council President, Donald Tusk, said, quote,

‘Reports that Brexit talks between Britain and the EU are deadlocked have been "exaggerated" ’.

Is it not the case that leaders of the remaining 27 EU member states told the UK there had been progress in the talks, and that they have given the green light for preparations to begin the second phase of Brexit talks, beginning with trade, paving the way for the possible start of formal talks on the future EU-UK trade relationship in December? Is it not a fact that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following those talks, said there are hopeful signs that they will plan for a December start to trade discussions with Britain, and she said we’re going to achieve ‘a good result’, there will be a good outcome? Why can’t you join that positive approach if you want a good outcome? Because your repeated diatribes on this issue keep fighting the messages of the referendum, despite your claim to accept them rather than allying yourself with the rabble opposite in opposing everything to do with this.

You referred to the EU withdrawal Bill. Whilst we share with you concern regarding restrictions on the legislative competence of this Assembly and accept the logic of UK Ministers consulting with us before making any changes to legislation with devolved competence, do you recognise that the UK Government approach taken was based on feedback they’d received from UK and Welsh industry and this was designed to be on the side of a strong economy? Perhaps you can tell us what Ford in Bridgend say about this, because I know what they’ve told the UK Government. The European withdrawal Bill is designed to provide the maximum possible certainty and continuity to businesses, employees and consumers across the whole UK that they will not be subject to unexpected changes and ensure the statute book is able to function on the day after we leave the EU. Will you confirm that you share that goal, albeit you have certain conditions that you still wish to be met?

You referred to ‘no deal’ not being an option, but will you recognise that, although some people may hold to that goal of a ‘no deal’, for most people this was a negotiating strategy and the fact—[Interruption.]—the fact that the popularity of the ‘no deal’ option amongst the UK population has driven a change in emphasis from many leading voices in the EU might have actually proved that the strategy worked? Where it is in everyone’s interests to secure a good deal, for both the UK and our friends and neighbours in the EU, while planning for all outcomes is the responsible approach, the UK Government believes that getting a good outcome, one that works for the peoples and businesses of the UK and for those in the EU is by far the most likely outcome. Need we ask why you, therefore, failed to acknowledge in your statement that both the Prime Minister and David Davis have consistently said that we want to see a full and comprehensive agreement with the EU retaining an open and free trading area across the European continent? [Interruption.] For them, it’s not even glass half full or half empty, it’s glass completely empty on a permanent, it seems, basis. You state that a soft Ireland-Northern Ireland border can only be maintained if we continue to work within a customs union within the EU.

I do need to hear the questions, and I think the First Minister needs to hear the questions, and I’m sure they’re coming to an end soon, sometime. [Assembly Members: ‘Hear, hear.’]

Why do you consistently rubbish and play down the technological eManifest solutions that HMRC have been working on now for 18 months and which apply between Canada, the US and countless borders across the world? If they can do it, then why do you think we can’t?

Finally—[Assembly Members: ‘Hurrah.’] They don’t like it up ’em, do they? Finally, why have you rejected the invitation—

Ask the question.

Why have you rejected—[Interruption.]

Ask the question.

That was a question. [Laughter.]

Why have you rejected the invitation for the Welsh Government to be present at the Secretary of State’s expert implementation panel for Wales, working to deliver a smooth and orderly exit from the EU in Wales? It’s going through functions in detail with the senior UK Ministers and officials directly involved in negotiations and you could be there, but Wales is missing out. The invitation to the Welsh Government, however, remains. Will you accept that invitation or will you continue to do things in parallel? Will you engage directly and accept the offer to engage directly with those senior officials and Ministers, or will you continue to throw your toys out of the pram?

It’s never a good idea to compare yourself to Lance Corporal Jones in ‘Dad’s Army’, is it? It was Clive Dunn who said so on the benches over there; he realised his mistake as soon as he said it, but I’ll leave him to reflect on that. Churchill—. Apart from the fact he talked about the wrong Chamberlain, Churchill is probably the wrong person to invoke in European debates, because Churchill said three things. First of all, at the time of the war, he wanted the UK and France to become one state—one country, one state. That was his view at the time. He was the first to be enthusiastic about a European Union. He was the first to mention a European army, actually, Churchill. Churchill would have had no truck with Brexit—I can promise that now—not considering what he said in the past.

Now, in terms of the final thing that he said, I can say that—. Yes, the Secretary of State for Wales—he does not have a good record of co-operation; I’ll put it that way. Let me give him an example of what’s happened recently. A brochure has been sent to all businesses in Wales, apparently from the Secretary of State for Wales’s office—not a single Welsh flag on it, may I add—explaining how the UK Government can help businesses. Well, so far so good, you might say. But then it goes on quoting different businesses in Wales who’ve had support from the Welsh Government, and many of the things that are mentioned there are export support, trade missions, finance, that have come from the Welsh Government, which the Secretary of State has tried to claim as his own. It’s not the first time he’s done it. He’s already claimed he brought Qatar Airways into Cardiff. He had no role at all in that. That was done—and I give credit to the individual who did it—by Roger Lewis, who is the chair of the airport. He was the one who showed the persistence to bring Qatar Airways in. So, the UK Government—. Well, no—the Secretary of State for Wales has a very poor record of co-operating and asking for co-operation when he sees fit. He has been invited, if I remember rightly, to the council for economic development. He hasn’t been yet, but nevertheless an invitation is there for him to come along. That is the forum for Welsh businesses to work with the Welsh Government, and there’s no reason why the Secretary of State can’t be at that forum rather than trying to create his own, which is what he’s trying to do at the moment.

Now, let’s turn to the points that Mark Isherwood made. Is there a need for co-operation? Yes. Is there a need for common standards? Yes, and in fact there’s need for common standards with the EU, actually. We can’t have our own standards. It makes no sense for that to happen. Secondly, is the destination in terms of certainty shared between us and the UK Government? Yes, it is. Yes, it is. We understand the need for there to be certainty for businesses, for there to be minimal interference in the single market of the UK. We understand that. The difference is we take the view that that destination should be travelled and reached by agreement of the Governments and not by the imposition of one rule by one Government on the other two—hopefully the other three in the future. So, what it means is that the UK Government could do anything it wanted in England, but we could not do the same in Wales. It means, for example—and he’s acknowledged he shares some of these concerns—that UK Ministers could amend devolved legislation passed in this place without asking this place or Welsh Ministers, or, indeed, the UK Parliament. That has to be wrong in principle. This is not designed to be a situation where London simply becomes the new Brussels, and is seen as somewhere that is remote and undemocratic. That is not something he and I would want to see, surely, as two who believe in the union.

In terms of the second phase of talks, he’s wrong to say that the EU and its constituent states have given the green light to the next phase of talks; what they have done is begun preparations for them. They are two different things. At the moment, the talks are stalled. I don’t want to see the talks stall—clearly not. I want for there be movement in those talks, and I hope that movement is there by December so that this can progress, so we don’t end up falling off the edge of a cliff in March. But it’s not right to say that the second phase of talks has been initiated. The reality is at the moment that the EU is far more united in terms of its aims and its goals than the UK is. We have a Prime Minister, and much of what she’s said I agree with. The Florence speech: there was much in that that I welcomed. And then you have Boris Johnson, who says something different. And then you have another Minister, Liam Fox, who says something different. The problem—and the frustration at EU level—is that the UK is seen as not having a clue what it wants, and not having an idea of what sort of outcome it wants to see.

The Prime Minister made what I think was a tactical mistake. She presented herself as being in favour, although she was a remainer, of a hard Brexit—outside of the customs union, outside of the single market—and went into an election thinking that was an electoral asset, and it wasn’t. As a result, she now has no mandate to take the UK forward on that hardest of Brexits. It’s hugely important, then, that the UK Government works with the devolved administrations to deliver—and we have to deliver Brexit—the kind of Brexit that has minimal negative effect on the economy of Wales and the rest of the UK. There is no justification for saying that, when people voted to leave the EU, they voted to leave the single market. There is no justification for saying that, when people voted to leave the EU, they voted to leave the customs union. None of these things were highlighted in the election, except by politicians from UKIP. Because politicians from UKIP said—for example, Daniel Hannan—nobody’s going to leave the single market. Nigel Farage said, ‘We can be like’—[Interruption.] I know you don’t like it, but Nigel Farage said, ‘We can be like Norway’. He said it. ‘We can have our cake and eat it’, to quote Boris Johnson. ‘We can be in the EEA’. People were misled last year. They were told that German car manufacturers would force a free trade agreement on the EU. It’s not going to happen. They care more about the single market than anything else. None of those things have come to pass.

Now, when we talk about ‘no deal’, we should be very clear about what that means. He doesn’t advocate it. That’s not what he’s advocating, but there are plenty in his party who do—not everybody. If we cannot negotiate a deal with our closest neighbours, with whom we share a land border, with whom we share a great deal of regulatory convergence, we have no hope of negotiating a deal with countries that don’t have any of those factors in common with us. How on earth could we? I don’t accept this idea that there is a nirvana out there of free trade agreements that will be to our benefit. There isn’t. If we leave the EU without a deal in March 2019, we will not have a free trade agreement with anyone—not with anyone—because none will have been agreed at that point. Where does that leave us? Isolated and unable to trade freely with other countries. That surely is not what anybody wanted to see. I don’t think that free trade agreements are the answer, actually. I think free trade agreements work well when they are concluded with countries with a similar income level as you. When they are not, you invite jobs to leave your country and go somewhere else. That was the main complaint in the US in the presidential election, that jobs had gone to Mexico because labour costs were cheaper. And that was because of a free trade agreement. So, we must be very careful about seeing free trade agreements as the panacea for everything. It depends which market and which country you are talking to.

Finally, he mentions the border. He will forgive me: I know it well, that border—very, very well. It’s unpoliceable. I remember it when the Troubles were still flaring. There were security checkpoints. Minor roads were blown up by the British army to stop people crossing them. There were designated checkpoints. Even then, it was not possible to police that border. No-one wants to go back to those days. Any kind of manifestation of a border invites problems in Northern Ireland. You come back to this point—I’ve heard the argument made—that there will be technological solutions. There aren’t any technological solutions. How can there be? For example, if goods are crossing between Ireland and the UK and vice versa, who regulates them? Nobody. There’s a self-declaration system, possibly, but, actually, it’s a light touch of policing; it’s an invitation for smuggling. Secondly, if there is no passport control on the border between Ireland and the UK, as long as somebody can get into Ireland, they can get into the UK. The UK loses control of its border in those circumstances. So, the idea that the UK will control its borders is impossible unless there is a physical manifestation of a border in Ireland. Technological solutions won’t work in that regard. It’s been suggested to me that there’ll be cameras. Those cameras won’t last long, because people will not accept any kind of manifestation of a border beyond the changing of colour of the lines at the side of the road, between yellow on one side and white on the other.

Now, these are issues that are not easy to resolve. They can be resolved if we stay in the customs union—done. There’s no problem in terms of goods. There’s more of a problem in terms of passport control, that’s true. It helps that the Republic is not in Schengen, that’s true. But, nevertheless, these are difficult, difficult questions that need to be answered, and we will offer our help to the UK Government to help to come to the conclusions that people want to see, namely a Brexit that satisfies what people voted for last year, but a Brexit that does not have a negative impact on the economies of Wales and Britain.

Today’s update on the Brexit negotiations reflects some of the messages coming from the Welsh Government following the recent JMC(EN) and touches on some of the issues that I raised with the First Minister last week. There’s mention that the UK Government, and I quote,

‘realises it needs to work far more closely with the devolved administrations’, and that the Welsh Government—and again I quote, appears—

‘to have seen a significant shift in the UK Government’s position’.

Now, I accept that those meetings may have become more positive, and the reason for this is that the UK Government has been on the ropes in terms of public opinion, in particular when it comes to leaving the EU without a deal. UK Ministers are desperate to avoid a row within the UK on how Brexit is carried out. Although we don’t know what a constitutional crisis would look like, we do know that the implications for the future of Scotland and, possibly, for the future of the peace process in Ireland could be significant. So, this largely explains why more positive signals may have been transmitted by the UK Government to the devolved administrations. But the problems remain, and, in our view, the power-grab risk remains.

Now, the issues over the negotiations with the EU-27 are of importance to Wales. Citizens’ rights are an issue where common sense has to prevail. Plaid Cymru’s view is that all EU citizens in Wales should be able to stay and, as part of that, we note the contribution that EU workers make to our tax take, our public services, and to our private sector. Also, the matter of the border in Ireland is critical to the prosperity and future of our ports, not least at Holyhead, and I would urge the First Minister to press that point home to even greater effect.

Turning to the impacts on this Assembly, the fact that a more constructive set of meetings has taken place does not change the overall nature of the negotiations. Plaid Cymru is very clear that the EU (Withdrawal) Bill enables a Westminster power grab, and last week we published a legal opinion to that effect. Our analysis is that we are heading for a situation where power in the British state will be concentrated at Westminster under the guise of operating a UK single market. Unlike the EU single market, where the rules are co-decided by EU member states, the devolved administrations will be treated as only consultees. Plaid Cymru believes that such arrangements inside the UK could be dealt with on the basis of equality between the nations, their Governments and their legislatures.

There are several procedural problems with the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, which means that Plaid Cymru cannot accept it. We want to prevent Ministers of the Crown from being able to use regulations to modify the devolved settlements. We want to remove the restrictions on Welsh Government Ministers to be able to correct deficiencies arising from withdrawal. And Plaid Cymru also believes that clause 11 of the Bill waters down our devolved powers in the most fundamental way. More than ever, we believe that a continuity Bill would be a unique way to address this.

So, turning to my questions, First Minister, first of all, do you now regret that Labour in Westminster voted to trigger article 50, given that there were no guarantees for EU citizens living in Wales? I asked you last week if you agreed with Damian Green that the talk of power grab was behind us, and you indicated in your answer that you believed a power grab was still a risk, although the meeting had been positive. Can I ask you today: are you content with being a consultee? Are you satisfied that being consulted on the future UK frameworks is sufficient, or do you support Plaid Cymru’s view that frameworks should be co-decided? In considering the future of political power in this state and where it lies, are we any closer to a UK council of Ministers being a reality?

Given all that you’ve said about the dangers of there being no deal, do you now accept that you should plan for that eventuality? All of us are agreed that that would be a bad outcome, but we’re also agreed that it could happen. So what are you going to do about it? You can’t deny that it could happen.

Finally, do you believe that the delay in the EU withdrawal Bill provides us with an opportunity for us to now go ahead with a continuity Bill?

On the continuity Bill, it is something, of course, that we’re still considering, but it would be better if progress was made in the JMC(EN). Are we in a position to recommend to the Assembly that we should approve the withdrawal Bill as it stands? No. I said that in what I said at the start of my statement. Are the UK Government now more engaged? The answer to that is ‘yes’. Why? Well, I think they’ve done the arithmetic in the Commons and the Lords. I think if they had a majority of over 100 we wouldn’t be in this position now. But it’s quite clear that the penny has dropped in that regard.

Damian Green is somebody who strikes me as somebody who you can talk to, and who will talk back at you—that helps. His involvement has certainly helped the process thus far, and we need him to continue in that role. Does this mean that we’re in a position where everything that we wanted has been produced? No. Do we think that common frameworks should the subject of agreement between the Governments? Yes, I’ve always said that. Much of what the leader of Plaid Cymru said I’ve said already, over many months. Do I think that the rules of a single market should be agreed, co-decided? Yes, I’ve said that many times, and I’ve said that there needs to be a court. One question I neglected to answer from Mark Isherwood is that there needs to be a court that will adjudicate on the single market. The Supreme Court of the United States is the court that regulates interstate commerce in the US. The European Court of Justice does it in the single market. The EFTA court does it for EFTA. There needs to be a court that regulates the UK single market. The Supreme Court could do that. It’s fairly easy to designate the Supreme Court as the court that would do it. What cannot happen is that the rules are made by the UK Government and disputes are decided by the UK Government. We’re still in a position where we have started a dispute resolution process over the Northern Ireland money with the UK Government and they are refusing to take it through the dispute resolution process of the JMC because they say that there is no dispute. Well, clearly there is. Now, we can’t have a situation like that continuing in the future, and, as I’ve said before, the JMC needs to evolve into a proper UK council of Ministers that deals with devolved issues and that takes soundings, at the very least, on non-devolved issues, in order for the UK to work properly.

In terms of the legal advice and the power grab, I could have given her that for nothing, because we know that’s the case already. She will know, in the discussions that have taken place between our parties in the past few months, that we all agree there’s going to be a power grab. That’s what clause 11 says. It would prevent the Assembly from using powers that would come to us automatically if they weren’t diverted down a side track to Whitehall. As I’ve said before, I cannot come before this Assembly and suggest to the Assembly that it should voluntarily give up powers that would arrive on its doorstep for an indefinite period. I’m not prepared to do that, and clearly that is still the position at the moment. More work needs to be done.

On the ports, again, it’s something that I’ve raised with both the UK Government and the Irish Government. I raised this issue with the Taoiseach. The reality is that 70 per cent of the trade between GB and Ireland goes through the Welsh ports. If it’s seen as easier to go through Liverpool and Cairnryan and Troon in Scotland into Northern Ireland, and then down over what would be a more seamless border, we will lose trade and we will lose jobs. That seems very clear to me. And so would Ireland, for that matter—so would the Republic of Ireland.

On the questions that she asks me, do I regret the triggering of article 50? No. I think that was in keeping with the referendum result. Do I regret the lack of progress since then? Yes, very much so. Very much so. I would have hoped there would have been much more progress than this by now. On the withdrawal Bill, yes, it’s been delayed. There are clearly problems as far as the UK Government is concerned, on many different fronts. We made it very clear to them that we’re not prepared to move, the Scots and ourselves. We’re not prepared to move on the current situation until we get satisfaction and the comfort that we need on behalf of the people of Wales that powers will arrive here as they should.

Finally, on the issue of ‘no deal’, yes, we can prepare for a ‘no deal’, but I cannot mislead people by saying that we can mitigate completely what the ‘no deal’ means. We just can’t. If our farmers cannot access—. If our sheep farmers cannot access the European market, which is by far the biggest export market for Welsh lamb, there is no other market where they can sell in at short notice. It’s not possible. No matter what people get paid in subsidy, they will find themselves with animals that they cannot sell, and that means the price will drop, as we know. There is no mitigating about that. We have gone out over the years, we have got Welsh lamb into other countries. When I was rural affairs Minister, we worked hard to get Welsh lamb into Dubai, and I know the Llywydd did as well when she succeeded me in that role. It has pride of place in supermarkets in Dubai now. We have other markets around the world where we have expanded Welsh lamb and its reach, but the reality is the European market is still, by far, the biggest market.

There are real issues in terms of the automotive sector and what the tariffs mean for that. A lot of our companies have operated on the basis that they’re European operations—Airbus is the same, the automotive industry is the same. To create an artificial barrier between one much smaller part of that operation and the rest of it makes no sense as far as I’m concerned. So, yes, we can help, but I cannot, hand on my heart, say that it’s possible to mitigate entirely the effect of no deal. If there’s no market then all you can really do is offer people an alternative to what they do already and say, ‘Sorry, you can’t export any more at the same level, we’re going to have shift you and we’ll have to retrain you as something else.’

For me, the way to avoid that is to say no to a ‘no deal’, frankly. Nobody said in the referendum last year that there would be no deal—nobody said it. All the leavers said there would be a deal: there would be a deal, and it would be a deal on the UK’s terms, the German car manufactures would enforce it, and we could be in the EEA. Nobody said, last year, that if we leave the EU, then we should leave everything and go to WTO rules. Nobody said it. And that was a deception; it was wishful thinking by people who came up with ideas that supported their own view on the world.

Finally, what is absolutely crucial is that those in Westminster and outside who think that the future of Wales and the UK and their relationship with the EU should be based on the principles of what seems to me to be nineteenth-century nationalism—that those people should be opposed at every opportunity. We are prepared to work with those in the UK Government who are pragmatic, who want to see the best outcome from Brexit, but that really does mean that we cannot pretend that we’re living in Victorian times and the world will fall at our feet.

I’m grateful to the First Minister for his statement, but to be honest, and this is no criticism of him, it’s a bit of a non-event, because what he’s reported is modest progress within the United Kingdom on the future relationship that the Welsh Government will have and this Assembly will have with the British Government and the United Kingdom Parliament. And as the First Minister rightly said, there’s been virtually no movement within the EU at all.

The only agreement that they have offered is that they might possibly talk amongst themselves about the way forward, but there’s certainly no firm offer on the table about the way further progress will be made in Brussels. I think we have to recognise that it’s that intransigence, not any intransigence on the part of the British Government, that has brought us to the pass that we’re at today.

It’s perfectly clear from the demand from the European Council that we can’t even begin to talk about trade negotiations until we solve what the First Minister in his own statement says is the minor matter of the money. We are talking about £20 billion that the Prime Minister has offered—British taxpayers’ money—which she shouldn’t have, in my view. The EU have not named a specific figure; it could be anything between £60 billion and £100 billion of our money that they are demanding, by way of ransom, before they even begin the negotiations on trade.

So, let us be quite clear where the principal fault lies here: it is not on the part of the British Government, although I’m certainly no admirer of the way in which they have conducted themselves in the course of this non-negotiation. All that the First Minister and anybody else has to do in order to understand the process that is going on here is to read the book that was published not so long ago by Yanis Varoufakis, ‘Adults in the Room’—a left-wing socialist who perhaps might not regard the First Minister as a socialist himself. But nevertheless, he has set out—[Interruption.] He is indeed a remainer. But he has set out in the course of this book what the EU’s negotiating tactics would be in the course of the Brexit negotiations. And the sequencing is absolutely key to it, because what the EU is playing here is a game of chicken—who is going to blink first? And if the money is unimportant to us, it’s even less important to the EU, because the GDP of the EU, of course, is many times that of the United Kingdom. So, the EU has as much of an interest in a sensible trade agreement with Britain as Britain has with it in the future. But they are playing a different game from the one that the First Minister seems to think they are playing.

Now, I’m pleased with the small progress that seems to have been made on sorting out the constitutional arrangements for the future within the United Kingdom, and I certainly agree with the broad general approach of the Welsh Government and, indeed, even with much of what the leader of Plaid Cymru said earlier on. But the principal difficulty that we have here is that EU withdrawal was voted for by the electorate of the United Kingdom and, indeed, by the electorate of Wales, and whilst I certainly am against any kind of legislative power grab from Westminster, even on a temporary basis, nevertheless the more important objective is for the whole of Britain, including Wales, to leave the EU, and the terms upon which it does that are not entirely within our control, obviously, because in an agreement you have to have both sides to come to a common position. And we have no idea what the EU’s bottom line is, but if we say that our bottom line is that we’ll take whatever’s going, then there won’t be any negotiation at all, which seems to me the fundamental basis of the First Minister’s approach to this. A ‘no deal’ is unthinkable; we can’t in any circumstances have no deal. Who on earth in business goes into a negotiation and says, ‘I’ll take whatever you offer me.’ That would be utter, utter madness. Of course, we want to have a deal—we’d like to have a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU—but if they’re not prepared to offer it, there’s nothing that we can do about it. And I would not accept the ransom approach that the EU seems to be proffering at the moment. The tactic is that Monsieur Barnier says that he doesn’t have a mandate to negotiate on anything until he is told he can do so by the European Council, so when Theresa May goes to the European Council to say, ‘We want to talk about free trade’, they say, ‘Oh no, you must go and talk to Michel Barnier’, and we get no further. And that’s why we are in the position that we’re at today.

I’m sorry that a good part of the statement is devoted to continuation of the ‘project fear’ approach that we had in the referendum, with the litany of bodies who are saying that we must have a deal at any price. The most preposterous of them, of course, is the British Retail Consortium saying that reverting to WTO tariffs might mean UK shoppers paying up to a third more for everyday food items. What is the point of the CAP if not to keep out cheap foreign food? The whole point about it is that world food prices are below the food prices of the EU. There wouldn’t be any point in having tariffs if food prices were more expensive in the rest of the world. Indeed, the average food price at farm gate levels in the EU is 17 per cent above that which applies on world markets. That is a significant dipping into the pockets of ordinary British people. Now, of course I believe in supporting British farmers, but the truth of the matter is that for every £1 that British taxpayers spend through the aegis of the EU on British farmers, we pay another £1 to support farmers in other parts of the EU. So, the idea that we couldn’t continue some form of agricultural support having left the EU is utter nonsense. In fact, we’d have more money to spend on farmers if we decided that was a desirable thing to do.

The First Minister says in the course of this statement that he doesn’t believe in selling taxpayers short, but he’s prepared to accept any deal that is going, so any sum that the EU wants to demand of us he will be prepared to pay. It could be £60 million, £100 million, £200 billion—any figure: ‘You name a price, we’ll pay it.’ That’s a brilliant negotiating tactic, isn’t it? No sensible person, certainly no responsible person, could ever go into an international negotiation on that basis. Of course, we have problems to sort out, not least the Irish border, which the First Minister knows a great deal about, as indeed do I, having been the Government whip for Northern Ireland at one time. But you can hardly talk about the future of our trade relationship with the Irish Republic if we can’t talk about our future trade relationship with the EU. So, the sequencing here is all wrong. So, they want us to give way on everything before they’ll talk about anything. Well, that isn’t a negotiation at all, and it’s very much against British interests if we were to support that.

So, I think that the First Minister would have got a good deal further in his, what we might call ‘domestic’, negotiations with the British Government if he’d been rather more optimistic about the outcome of Brexit or at least the opportunities for British success as a result of having the freedom to trade more freely in the world. I know he’s very pessimistic about the possibilities of entering into free trade agreement with other countries, but there are many countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, who are very keen to begin the process of talks. And, indeed, they are, in an informal way, beginning. But, as the clock ticks, let’s be absolutely clear that the British people and the Welsh people on 23 June last year, voted to leave the European Union, no ifs or buts. The idea that nobody was told that this would mean leaving the single market or the customs union—. Every single remainiac was banging the drum and using those words every single minute of every day during the referendum campaign. And, of course, nobody could guarantee what the outcome of future trade negotiations with the EU might be. They may not appreciate where their rational self-interest lies. After all, there’s a great deal of irrationality contained within the EU. What is the eurozone if not a monstrous edifice of irrationality that has beggared half a continent?

So, if only the First Minister were to be a bit more optimistic about not just the hopes and aspirations of the British people but also their ability to make a success of their country in the world in the future, he might have had a great deal more listening from the British Government to what he’s had to say.

Well, the eurozone’s doing very well, actually—better than Britain is at this moment in time. I don’t know if he’s seen the growth figures in the eurozone. There was a strand of naivety that went through, once again, the speech that was made by the leader of UKIP. Let’s recap what was said last year. I don’t want to re-fight the referendum, but it’s worth reminding ourselves of the context here. Three hundred and fifty million pounds a week will be available for the NHS: rubbish. We will control our own borders: nonsense. There will be an immediate free trade agreement with the European Union because the German car manufacturers will force it to happen: cloud-cuckoo-land. There will be free trade agreements in place with all manner of countries before March 2019: ridiculous. For a start, the UK has no experience of negotiating free trade agreements. All these things that were said last year are simply not true. They never were true. So, we have to adapt to the current situation.

Now, the thrust of what the leader of UKIP was saying was basically this: it’s not fair the EU won’t give us what we want. He’d used a word like ‘ransom’. What business negotiation takes place where one side goes in and says to the other, ‘We want absolutely everything our own way; absolutely everything our own way, and, if you don’t compromise, then we’re going to walk away’? That is not, I tell you, a sensible place to be in a business negotiation. It was believed that the EU would fall apart. It’s not going to fall apart. David Davis said he’d be in Berlin first, negotiating with the Germans. It’s not going to happen. The single market’s far more important to German industry than anything else. Britain’s an important market, but the EU single market’s far, far bigger than Britain. The reality is that Britain’s a fifth of the size of the EU. I think he summed it up himself that the difficulty was the vote last year. Well, it was the difficulty he advocated. So, he can’t resile from it now. I don’t accept that people last year voted to leave the EU on the terms that he has suggested. The reality is that people were asked to vote for a concept. They weren’t asked to vote as to how that concept would operate. They weren’t asked about a customs union. People didn’t understand what it was. They weren’t asked about the single market. People didn’t understand what it was. Despite that, there were remainers saying, ‘We will stay in the single market. We will be fine. We’ll stay in the customs union. We will have a comprehensive free trade agreement.’ And now he’s criticising the EU for doing what he himself would advocate the UK doing—looking after their own interests. Of course they’re going to do that. So, there has to be an admission here that there has to be compromise on both sides.

The problem lies, to my mind at the moment, with the UK. The UK doesn’t know what it wants. We’ve got a UK Government that doesn’t really know what kind of Brexit it wants to see, and that needs to be resolved first. He mentioned food prices. Of course, what he doesn’t seem to understand is that we would then see tariffs imposed on food coming in from the rest of the EU, where a substantial amount of our imports come from. Prices are bound to go up because tariffs on food are very, very substantial. On top of that, Welsh exports—Welsh lamb, particularly—would become massively more expensive overnight. It’s bound to. If you have tariffs, there’s no avoiding it; that’s going to happen. It means Welsh lamb is more expensive in its most important market. That’s what ‘no deal’ means. It means demand will drop. It means farmers will have animals they cannot sell. No amount of money is going to help them if they can’t sell what they produce. So, there are animal welfare issues that will have to be looked at. There is no getting around this. We will find ourselves in the position, if we have tariffs, where many goods are more expensive in the UK, particularly food and drink, and we will find that what we export becomes much more expensive, and we don’t need to do this.

Nobody advocates the imposition of tariffs, that’s true, but we should be very, very careful not to be in a situation where tariffs are, in fact, imposed. Who’s going to govern the tariffs between the Irish Republic and the UK? Who’s going to do it? There are no checks, so what do we do to mitigate smuggling, both ways? If there are no border controls, what are you going to do to mitigate people trafficking? All of these things have just not been thought through. The arrogant assumption of many of the Brextremists was that Ireland would leave the EU with the UK, because the people of Ireland are well known for doing what they’re told by the UK. None of this was thought through.

Now, he talked about the freedom to trade. It’s seductive. If I was Australia and New Zealand, I would love to have a free trade deal with the UK. Why wouldn’t I? What do we get in return? Australia is much smaller than the UK, and New Zealand has 4 million people. If you have a free trade deal with New Zealand, it’s wonderful for New Zealand—I concede that. Their lamb would be able to come into the UK without any kind of restriction at all. Where does that leave Welsh farmers? What do we get out of it? How can you replace a market of 500 million people with a market of 4 million people? It just doesn’t work. The arithmetic isn’t there.

I know, in India, for example, that the discussions with the Indian Government went badly, because the Indian Government, the Indian Prime Minister, made the point, ‘Well, if we’re looking at a free trade agreement, what about our students? What about the visa restrictions you put on our students?’ The Indian Government’s position, if I can sum it up—and I think I do them justice—is to say, ‘Well, if you want a free trade agreement, we want to see freer movement of people.’ That’s the reasonable position of India, with over a billion people. That’s the position that they will take. Of course, when he talks about our free trade with Commonwealth countries and, perhaps, freedom of movement with Commonwealth countries, he doesn’t mean every Commonwealth country, does he? He means those such as Australia and New Zealand.

So, these things have to be considered very, very carefully. What I do know is that all the things, all the optimism, that the Brexit camp said was there last year has gone. All the things they said would happen, they haven’t happened. They haven’t happened. So, we have to be realistic. Yes, we have to implement the vote that people had, but I do not believe that a Brexit on the hardest terms is what people voted for. They were told it wouldn’t happen, and if that is what people are being asked to face, if it is the case that we end up with no deal, we’d have an immediate general election. People would have every right to express a view on what would have been a failure and what would have been a set of circumstances where they felt they would have been misled. I hope it doesn’t come to that, because people will suffer if it comes to that. Jobs will go and people will be paying more for what they buy. I don’t want that.

So, let’s put aside this talk of no deal. Of course no-one’s suggesting that we should pay whatever the European Union asks for. I made that point in my statement. There has to be a sensible compromise on this. We have to sort out the issue of each other’s citizens. People feel that they are being held hostage, within the EU as well as the UK. That needs to be resolved. But we are now 15 months on and still not enough progress has been made. We need progress by December. We need to move on. Let’s put aside this fantasy land of massive and huge amounts of free trade agreements in place by March of 2019—that isn’t going to happen—and let’s focus on getting the best deal with our closest market: 400 million people after we’ve left, our nearest neighbour. That has to be the challenge. The idea of walking away from our obligations basically sends the message that the UK does not stand by its commitments. Who would trust us after that? The matter in hand is dealing with getting access to our biggest market, and that’s the single market. That is where the focus should come and not anywhere else at this moment in time.

We are way over time allocated for this statement. I have many speakers who’ve indicated that they want to ask questions. Ask short, single questions, with short answers, and I’ll try and call as many of you as possible. David Rees.

Diolch, Llywydd. I’ll try and be as short as I can. First Minister, I rise to speak following the leader of UKIP in the Assembly who, once again, seems to prefer his opinion to fact in this matter, and I will try and stick to the facts.

The issues in your statement highlight two areas, which are about the processes and the progress of those processes, both in Westminster and in Brussels. In relation to Westminster, the committee I chair, the external affairs committee, has actually looked very carefully at the EU withdrawal Bill and suggested its own six areas where we believe the Bill needs to be modified, which not only reflects what the Welsh Government has asked for, but actually goes beyond that and looks at the role of the Assembly and its ability to scrutinise Ministers within our Government to ensure that we can maintain that, and it is proper for our democracy that we are able to do so. So, can I ask a question on what are your red lines as a Government on that withdrawal Bill? You’ve highlighted where you’ve worked with the Scottish Government. Well, we’ve gone beyond that. What are your red lines before you can decide whether that Bill has now been amended sufficiently for the Government to accept it?

In relation to the progress in Europe, we’ve actually had the opportunity to ask questions of the three leading European representatives: Didier Seeuws for the council, Michel Barnier for the Commission, and Guy Verhofstadt for the Parliament. I would love to have an opportunity to actually ask the same questions of the leading UK negotiator, but he is yet to come to us. When we met Michel Barnier he actually—I quote, in a sense—didn’t want a ‘no deal’ situation. He actually wanted a deal and he wants to work in the best interests of both EU-27 and the UK, and he stated that it’s important to note that the UK asked to leave, and as you pointed out, it would not be right to expect the EU-27 to pay for all the commitments made in agreement with the UK in the MFF. As you highlighted just now in your answer, it would be a failure to honour those agreements and it could be problematic. So, who would trust a new trade agreement with a country that doesn’t honour its commitments made properly? So, I think we need to address that, but can you ask the question on—? Leanne Wood highlighted the question of whether you’re contingency planning for a ‘no deal’, but have you done any analysis of a ‘no deal’ situation? Has the UK Government actually discussed with you its impact analysis of a ‘no deal’, which it seems to be failing to actually give to its own Parliament? Has it shared that with the devolved institutions?

Also, on the JMC’s cycle of meetings, I appreciate that you think there’s progress being made, and it’s wonderful to actually see one actually taking place eight months after the last one, but the next one, I understand, is before Christmas. The cycle of negotiations in Brussels are every four weeks, so will you be pushing for more cycles of the JMC(EN) so we can actually have an input into the discussions or the negotiations, better than simply being reported to by the UK Government? And on the customs White Paper—

That’s three questions now, and I asked for only one.

Can I give one more?

The First Minister will answer. You’ll have plenty of opportunities to raise issues on Brexit again, I’m sure. [Interruption.]

I think the problem is this—

We’ve had long spokespeople’s questions. We have had long First Minister answers. I think this is an important issue—it deserves the time to be extended—but I do need to call more of you than I have been able to to date.

Okay. What would satisfy us is a removal of the power grab, a commitment to a co-operative approach to the UK single market, a commitment to a co-operative and agreed approach on frameworks, on state aid, and also on the way in which the market is regulated and the adjudication of a court. Those are our red lines in terms of the power grab.

In terms of impact analysis, others have done that analysis. None of it is good. The UK Government, we think, has done one and we don’t think it’s particularly good because it’s not been shared with anybody else. Should there be more frequent JMC meetings? Yes. I’d like there to be a JMC plenary as well as a JMC (European negotiations). We have a British-Irish Council coming up next month and I have a meeting planned with the Prime Minister next week, which is progress. Should they meet more often? Yes. We also have bilaterals as well, I should add, on top of the JMC, which help us to talk through some of these issues as well. It’s a matter of regret that it took eight months for the JMC to meet. One of the problems in the past was it met irregularly, with different chairs all the time and people not knowing what had gone on in the meeting before or who was sitting in the chair. There needs to be a consistency; the same people need to be at those meetings every single time in order for progress to be made. That’s what we need. That’s what we’ve been saying for many months now, and that’s what we’ll continue to be advocating.

Would the First Minister agree that we are facing the decisions of two referendums that conflict with each other? First of all, the referendum to leave the European Union—the result was clear, but by a small majority. But there is another important referendum for us in this place, which is the referendum that was held in 2011, when the people of Wales voted to add legal powers to the powers of this place. Isn’t it therefore entirely inappropriate that we should pass a legislative consent motion to a Bill that withdraws powers from the Parliament of Wales?

Well, that’s right. What’s on the face of those Acts in 1997 and 2011 is entirely clear, namely that the people of Wales have powers with regard to intervention and with regard to how those powers were implemented. Nobody has put this in their manifesto. This wasn’t mentioned last year in the referendum. The United Kingdom has no right to say, ‘Well, the powers that will come back to you in the devolved areas will come to us instead.’ The people of Wales have made their opinion very clear in 2011 as well about what powers this place should have. It’s not appropriate for the Bill that takes us out of the European Union to interfere in any way with the results of those referenda.

A fair-minded person would actually begin by commending the constructive but firm manner of the discussions that the First Minister has had with the UK Government on the EU withdrawal Bill and the machinery of Government changes as well. As a fair-minded person, I will give credit where it’s due. But on the question of the legislative consent motion and also the necessary machinery of Government changes, whether it’s a strengthened Joint Ministerial Committee or a Council of Ministers, can I urge him please not to give out the prize too easily, based on the submissions that both David Rees’s committee, the External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee, and our committee, the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, have had and our joint evidence session, plus our visit last week to the inter-parliamentary forum on EU withdrawal. What we have heard would suggest strongly that he needs to hold very fast and he needs to get the changes both within the machinery of Government and also the LCM that is necessary and not to give up easily on that.

But could I ask him where he stands on the growing cross-party consensus in the UK Government that the final deal, and especially a ‘no deal’, should be put to a vote in the UK Parliament in, actually, a true demonstration of parliamentary sovereignty, or in the Brexiteers’ colloquialism, ‘getting our country back’?

Well, I can assure the Member that there’ll be no prize that will be given up—I don’t see it as a prize, I see it as fairness and I see it as respect for the referendum results and I see it as a commitment to a co-operative approach as partners within the union. It’s not much, surely, to ask.

In terms of the issue of a deal, I have said that any deal should be subject to a vote, not just in the UK Parliament, but here as well and in the Scottish Parliament and we hope, of course, at some point in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Why? Because there will be devolved areas that will be affected by that. To get the widest possible buy-in for a deal, it makes perfect sense to me to have a vote in each of the four institutions. If there’s no deal, that would be such an abject failure that there would need to be an immediate general election.

When the committee met with Michel Barnier, he reminded us that many of the agreements required to give effect to the long-term relationship between the UK and Europe are actually mixed agreements—they’re not within the gift of the council and the Parliament to resolve: they require diplomacy and a long-term strategy with each of the member states. What steps do you think the Welsh Government and the UK Government need to take now to get that process under way as soon as possible, given its complexity and given its capacity to derail the long-term relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU?

Well, really, we need to see progress over the course of the next few months. Time is running out. We have to remember that there needs to be an agreement by this time next year, effectively, because then there’s an ratification process, not just in European institutions, but in every single Parliament, and in some cases, like Belgium, in regional Parliaments as well. That all takes a great deal of time. Just one of them, as we know from the Canadian trade agreement, can derail the process. This has never been done before.

There is some hope because, of course, this is not a situation where two markets come together to agree free access, which have never had that level of access before. We already have free access, so, really, it’s not as difficult to negotiate a free trade agreement with—or shouldn’t be—the EU as it is with other countries with whom we’ve never had—like the US—a free trade agreement. There’s urgency. I’m going to try and be fair here the Prime Minister needs to be able to conduct these negotiations without noises off from within her own Cabinet. That’s absolutely essential. She’s given us a better idea of what she wants to do. I agree. I think that what she outlined in Florence is perfectly sensible, but she needs to have the support of those in her Cabinet, and that, so far, has been lacking.

And finally, Eluned Morgan. [Interruption.] Wonderful. Thank you, First Minister, for that.