The opposition parties all voted down a legally binding withdrawal agreement that almost all of them, in contrast to the ERG and the DUP, would have signed up to. And this was because the Government had not even tried to address the legitimate concerns that the political declaration—an integral part of the Prime Minister’s withdrawal deal—was too vague and gave no guarantee that, in the next phase of the negotiations, the UK’s fundamental economic interests would be put first. Rather, they simply detached the political declaration entirely. What Government could possibly believe that replacing a list of vague aspirations with a blank sheet of paper could ever convince the doubters that the future of our country’s relationship with Europe was in safe hands? This is a Government of gimmicks.

And this less than 48 hours after the Prime Minister had promised, or threatened, to step down if her deal went through, opening the way, unless there is a general election and a change of Government, to a Prime Minister Johnson, Raab or Rees-Mogg, any one of whom would be happy to put the pursuit of a mythical sovereignty ahead of real jobs, real livelihoods and real incomes. As a result of this unprecedented failure of leadership and governance, we are again barely a week away from a potential ‘no deal’ Brexit, with all the short-term chaos and long-term economic damage that would entail. And let me remind colleagues of a few aspects of political realities that too many of the British commentariat find inconvenient.

There is absolutely no guarantee that the EU27 will grant any extension if we do not have a clear strategy for the way forward, with a majority in Parliament and a Government committed to delivering it. As I found in Strasbourg last month, many politicians across Europe just want to be rid of the endless uncertainty and disruption caused by the failure of the political establishment in the UK to grasp even the basic truths of international negotiations—for example, that you have to start by understanding the fundamental interests of the counter party and to identify and build on areas of mutual advantage, that the economically weaker party will always have to yield more, that no-one can get everything they want, particularly when some of the negotiating objectives are mutually exclusive, and that you always have to deliver on undertakings you have made. It would not be odd for them to conclude that the economic damage to the EU27—significant but manageable—and any political fall-out would be worth tolerating if they were left to get on with addressing their own priorities, not ours.