Well, Llywydd, can I thank Paul Davies for that thoughtful and constructive contribution, and many points on which I think we have some agreement? I'll try and deal with his questions as best I can. He asked for an account of the latest state of play in relation to discussions on inter-governmental relations. And I'm sorry to begin with a less than positive note, but he will know that a review of inter-governmental relations was agreed at a JMC plenary 18 months ago—agreed between my predecessor, Carwyn Jones, and Prime Minister Mrs May and Nicola Sturgeon. Responsibilities were shared out amongst the nations to lead on six different themes within that review, and yet that review is still to conclude. And, without any JMC plenary in the diary, there's no mechanism for it being able to report even on the progress that has been made. And, to be fair, I hear through officials that some progress has been made in some of those strands—the principal strands that the Welsh Government has led on, and some more recent progress in relation to independent forms of dispute resolution, and that would be a genuine step forward, if we were to be able to make progress in that area. But the progress is desperately slow. It has nowhere near the sense of urgency that is necessary, given the fact that we may be about to leave the European Union within a matter of days. And it's a reflection of the frustration that we have felt that even when you get an agreement with the UK Government that work is needed to be done, it stretches out to infinity before you get any sense of resolution. 

Llywydd, I was very glad to hear what the leader of the opposition said about overlapping abilities to legislate, because at the heart of some of the proposals in our document is a separation of those responsibilities and a rowing back of the ability in the current settlement for a UK Parliament to override the legislative competence and responsibility, and indeed decision making, of devolved bodies.

We put forward proposals for the Sewel convention. Sewel is meant to be the defence against the UK Government legislating arbitrarily in devolved areas, but, as the Supreme Court said in the Miller case, it is an entirely political convention and it needs codification at the very least, in the way that we set out. Because, at the moment, the way that Sewel operates is that it is entirely in the hands of the UK Government to decide when a 'not normal' set of circumstances have been arrived at. They make that judgment; they decide how to act. They have to report to nobody on how they came to that conclusion, and we set out ways in which Sewel could be codified. It could be set out in a set of rules that at least would be challengeable by those who take a different view. We proposed that the House of Commons and the House of Lords would have separate responsibilities in having reports on the operation of Sewel, and where, if a UK Government decided to try to legislate in an area devolved to us, against the will of the National Assembly, we would have, or the National Assembly would have, rather, the ability to make representations to the House of Commons and the House of Lords to put the alternative point of view. That, I think, is a way of reforming the status quo, but we go beyond that in the paper and propose a future in which there is just clear separation of responsibilities and the ability of the UK Government to intervene would be removed.

I agree very much, Llywydd, with what Paul Davies said about devolution for a purpose. When we decide on the principles of subsidiarity, where powers should rest, it should be because there is a rationale behind that. There's a theme in the paper that he will have seen where some of the ways in which powers are dispersed across the United Kingdom lack any sense of coherence. And therefore, we argue for that sense of rationality in the way that powers are distributed, and powers distributed because there is a reason for them being located where they are.

In relation to fiscal responsibilities, we argue for a UK fiscal framework; we mentioned this earlier this afternoon. But if there is to be a UK fiscal framework, then its implementation has to be supported by a dispute resolution mechanism that is independent of any of the four parties. So, we're not asking for it to be in our hands, but nor should it be in the hands of the Treasury, and at the moment it is entirely in the hands of the Treasury—judge, jury, executioner: all the parts are played by just the one player. Now, we set out ways in which a new level of independence could be introduced to that.

In relation to how a new settlement could be safeguarded, well, we will look with interest at the report of Lord Andrew Dunlop, asked by the former Prime Minister, Theresa May, to carry out a piece of work about the future operation of the United Kingdom. I met Lord Dunlop here on 17 September, I enjoyed my conversation with him. He plans to report in November, and we will look at that report to see for a sense in which an entrenched devolution system that is genuinely safeguarded against depredations by others can be put onto the statute book.

And finally, in relation to citizen engagement, I think it's very important to say that the type of convention that we suggest in the final proposition in the paper is a UK-wide convention. It's not a Welsh convention in which we just rely on the Welsh Government or Welsh citizens. It has to be a convention that involves the whole of the United Kingdom—the four constituent parts—and where citizen engagement would take part right across the United Kingdom, we would want to play our part here, but it would rely on others beyond Wales.