2. What discussions has the Counsel General had with counterparts in the UK Government in respect of the Wales Act 2017? OAQ54877

My discussions with counterparts often cover our respective devolution settlements. As the Welsh Government's constitutional policy, 'Reforming our Union: Shared Governance in the UK', notes, as a result of the Wales Act 2017, the reserved-powers model is now the preferred model for legislative devolution. But, importantly, unhelpful asymmetries remain.

Counsel General, what was important about the 2017 Act was, of course, that it did enshrine the Sewel convention. However, it enshrined it in a way that leaves it open to interpretation and to uncertainty about its actual status. Now, in the post-Brexit environment, where we see increasing strains on the incursion into devolved areas of responsibility, it seems to me the whole status of the Sewel convention is now seriously under jeopardy. Do you belive that now is the time for serious consideration to be given to a disputes procedure to be established between the nations of the UK, in respect of what is devolved and devolved powers of responsibility? And do you agree also with me that it is now time to consider that the Sewel convention should be put into a format that makes it justiciable?

I thank the Member for that further set of questions. On the point about the resolution and avoidance, ideally, of course, of disputes between the Governments of the UK, that has been a long-standing call of the Welsh Government, and has been a matter that we have been pressing in discussions, both at ministerial and official level, with the UK Government and with other devolved Governments across the UK.

The Sewel convention remains a very, very important convention despite not being justiciable. But it provides the UK Government with considerable discretion about what circumstances are normal or not normal, which is the key to the application of the convention. That, in our view, as a Government, is not a sustainable way forward and we want to see a clear specification of the circumstances under which the UK Government could, in extremis, take forward legislation in defiance of this institution's lack of consent. We should consider setting that out in statute, which would then provide a platform for judicial oversight of the operation of the convention. But that, on its own, isn't going to be sufficient, it seems to me, to fix the problem that we face.

When the Scottish Parliament refused its consent in 2018 to the EU withdrawal Bill, neither House of the Parliament was given any real opportunity to consider the implications of proceeding without consent. So, we want to see a more explicit parliamentary stage for consideration of the implications of going forward without the consent of a devolved institution involving, perhaps, statements by UK Ministers to the House. There is, of course, a clearer and a more radical solution as well, which is simply to provide that Parliament simply will not legislate in devolved areas without the consent of the democratic devolved institutions.