First of all, yes, in terms of the UK frameworks, UK plus 1, we believe, is a reasonable way of resolving disputes. We’d hope, of course, that there would be unanimity, but in the absence of unanimity, there has to be a process in place that deals with how to get decisions done.

In terms of binding frameworks, those frameworks wouldn’t be binding by statute, but they would be binding by agreement. Now, that would mean, for example, that if a business felt that state aid rules were being breached by one Government, it would have the confidence to go to the adjudication body in order for their complaint to be dealt with. So, it’s not so much a question of one Government complaining about another; it’s more to do with businesses taking issues to court that they feel breach state aid rules, much as is the case now.

In terms of what the court itself would do, it would be an adjudicator, rather than an arbitrator. It has to be a decision maker in that regard. It would simply be the case that the parties agree that that court should be the independent court that binds them. It’s common in internal single markets. The US Supreme Court acts as the regulator for interstate commerce within the US, so preserving the United States’ single market in terms of goods and services. As far as the EFTA Court is concerned, it does the same for EFTA; the ECJ does the same for the European single market. There has to be, in any single market, if there are going to be rules, an independent adjudicator that polices those rules, as I’ve said before.

In terms of the council of Ministers, he raises an intriguing point: should it have statutory underpinning? I suppose that statutory underpinning would be via joint legislation that would have to be taken through all four parliaments at the same time in order for it to have the kind of statutory underpinning that would be required. That’s an interesting idea. The co-ordination of it would present a challenge, but nevertheless it’s one that certainly is worthy of examination. But ultimately, an internal single market can only work if there is agreement between the parties that exist within that market and if there is a body to police those rules. Otherwise it ceases to be an internal single market, and it then becomes a market where it’s possible, effectively, to have trade wars within that market, and that’s not something, surely, that we would welcome, particularly given our size and the chaos it would cause within that market.